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81 introDuCtion
The idea of universal, inalienable and equal human rights is an attempt to find a 
solution to the tension between freedom and order. In liberal society people want 
to decide how they live their lives, and what they consider as good and right. This 
freedom cannot, however, be unlimited as people may want things that are harmful 
for themselves and others. For this reason, we need standards and principles to 
know what is acceptable and what is not. One solution for this dilemma is the idea 
of human rights that are often thought to provide us with absolute, non-negotiable 
and un-political guidance in complex situations in plural societies.
When abstract human rights principles are turned into practice, their meaning 
is not that clear anymore. Human rights are open and conflicting concepts that can 
be used to promote almost any kind of goal. On the one hand, human rights are 
universal, but on the other hand in every concrete situation they have to be defined 
or balanced by those who have power to do so. Don’t rights in this balancing exercise 
lose their universality, and how do we know what is the right interpretation of an 
open human rights norm? Human rights principles are at the heart of modern 
political debate, but when implemented in practice they can also become a part of 
power, bureaucracy and governance.
Democracy and rights are not necessarily friends either. Free election can bring 
to power governments that do not respect minority rights or rights of women, for 
example. In Libya or Tunisia it remains to be seen whether democracy will entrench 
or endanger the rights of Christians, dissidents or sexual minorities, for example. 
Then there is the question of human rights and culture: is human right a Western 
concept or can it be applied universally in all cultural contexts? 
As human rights seem to be rather complicated concept, it is interesting to look 
at the problem of rights critically and from different contexts and perspectives. 
I try to do this with my seven articles or “case studies” and the synthesis that 
complements them theoretically. In the following pages I will explore the claimed 
universality of rights and its relation to the democracy. I discuss human rights and 
its relation to the concept of culture and freedom of religion. I analyze the ability 
of human rights to provide protection to refugees as well as some paradoxes that 
might compromise the abstract promise of protection. I look at human rights as 
important universal standards that also make it possible to exclude particular people 
from this universalism.  
Some of my articles discuss human rights in rather formal and abstract way, 
and some articles raise more practical and critical perspectives to the operation of 
rights. I try to show that we have to look human rights simultaneously as a theory 
9and practice, if we are to avoid a clichéd concept of human rights.  It is clear that 
my research reveals only partial truths, and is limited to the perspectives that I 
raise in my articles. Other articles would probably raise different kinds of dark and 
bright sides of rights. As my articles were written during a long period of time, I also 
provide some comments and afterthoughts (section: comments) in the synthesis 
to some of my articles. 
Human rights rhetoric has had a liberating and positive meaning for societies. 
The human rights movement has received good results in naming and shaming 
repressive governments and those who commit abuses.  But when more and 
more claims are dressed up in human rights terms, there is a danger that human 
rights will lose their capacity to make any difference at all. For this reason, it is 
interesting to explore human rights from pragmatic perspective. The successes of 
human rights movement and institutions have never based on wishful or utopian 
thinking. Therefore, it is necessary to keep on asking what human rights do achieve 
in practice, and who are the winners and losers. 
I have organised the rest of this synthesis in the following way. In section 2 I 
provide an introduction to the problem with rights. In section 3 I say a few words 
about the key concepts used in this synthesis. In section 4 I examine human rights 
from a theoretical perspective. However, I want to analyse and discuss the theoretical 
aspects of rights only to the extent they provide some additional theoretical value 
for my articles. In that section I first discuss human rights as so-called universal, 
inalienable and equal rights. After this I will say a few words about the theoretical 
discussion of the link between human rights and democracy. I will end section 4 
by looking at human rights as rules, standards and institutions. 
In section 5 I will look at the practice of human rights. I am mainly interested in 
the critical perspectives regarding the practical operation of rights. In this section 
I will explore both modern and historical criticisms of rights to provide some new 
and complementary perspectives to my articles. One way to deal with the tension 
between abstract human rights and their practical realization is to look at the 
operation of human rights from a pragmatic perspective. This is done in section 6. 
After setting up the general theoretical framework of my synthesis, I will focus on 
the structure of my thesis (section 7). In section 8 I will provide short summaries 
of my seven articles, and in section 9 I will describe the methods that were used in 
them. Finally, in section 10, human rights as theory and practice are discussed in 
the context of my articles. In my concluding observations, (section 11) I will try to 
approach a non-clichéd view of human rights.         
I will start my synthesis by looking at the problem of rights as an interplay 
between theory and practice.  
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2 the ProbLem with rights
By constantly challenging the relations of inclusion-exclusion implied 
by the political constitution of the “people” – required by the exercise 
of democracy – liberal discourse of universal human rights plays an 
important role in maintaining the democratic contestation alive. On the 
other side, it is only thanks to the democratic logic of equivalence that 
frontiers can be created and a demos established without which no real 
exercise of rights could be possible.
Chantal Mouffe: The Democratic Paradox
Human rights operate in two different, but connected worlds: on the one hand, 
human rights are abstract conventions, norms, principles and ideals, while on 
the other hand these same rights receive their meaning in professional practice.2 
When human rights operate in professional contexts, the two perspectives merge 
into each other: a desired policy goal or appropriate outcome is justified by 
referring to human rights, and human rights norms give guidance and inspiration 
to practice. 
In human rights work – in the human rights movement, for example – or in 
general human rights arguments, this distinction between theory and practice is 
sometimes lost. Human rights are seen as a fairly unproblematic whole that in 
practice leads to good results. The duty of the human rights lawyer is to make sure 
that in concrete cases the theory and the practice look compatible, or to convince 
others that the abstract right and its practical realisation are “correctly” understood. 
Otherwise, it would not necessarily be wise at a general level to “promote human 
rights”, to create “human rights policies” or to support “human rights friendly 
decisions”: it would not be clear whether we were promoting abstract human rights 
norms, or their different – good and bad – practical consequences. Often the main 
challenge for the human rights community seems to be to make it clear that everyone 
has human rights, and to “move with determination from rhetoric to enforcement 
of human rights standards.”3 At the outset of this introduction, however, I want 
to keep theory and practice separate. This is one way to discuss the problem with 
human rights and the tensions that are involved in their practical operation.  
2 According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica “human rights refer to a wide variety of values and capabilities 
reflecting the diversity of human circumstances and history. They are conceived of as universal, applying 
to all human beings everywhere, and as fundamental, referring to essential or basic human needs.” http://
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/275840/human-rights. Visited in October 2011. 
3 Commissioner for Human Rights press release, Strasbourg 27.1.2007. In the file of the author. 
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Indeed, human rights and their operation in practice are two interconnected 
realms. For example, at an abstract level it is easy to claim that human rights 
are “universal” or that “non-discrimination”, “freedom of religion” or “not to be 
subjected to inhuman treatment” are important human rights. In practice, however, 
we can have very different understandings of the practical meaning, interpretation 
and consequences of these rights. Placing an abstract human right into a concrete 
situation causes problems of correct interpretation and balanced reasoning. The 
more we emphasise one human right, or one interpretation of that right, the more 
we might have to exclude other possible human rights or interpretations of rights. 
If resources are limited, whether we prioritise, for example, the human right to 
education, instead of the human right to housing is not irrelevant. If we prioritise 
freedom of religion in a multicultural society, we may have to accept practices that 
are contrary to human rights to equality. Indeed, when abstract human rights are 
turned into practical measures they can create unexpected consequences and thus 
become a “part of the problem”.4
This tension between human rights and their practical realisation is, of course, 
nothing new or dramatic to people who are working with human rights conventions. 
Human rights lawyers like me, are, on a daily basis, dealing with abstract human 
rights conventions and language, which in every concrete case must be turned into 
practical measures. This is not an easy task, however, as the concrete meaning of 
human rights does not logically follow from their abstract formulation. Freedom of 
religion, for example, is a fundamental human right, but does it in practice include 
a right to wear a headscarf at school, or to establish a political party, or to have or 
not to have an abortion? The European Convention on Human Rights stipulates 
(in Art. 5) that everyone who is arrested or detained shall be brought “promptly” 
before a judge, and shall be entitled to trial within a “reasonable time”. But how do 
we decide what is a reasonable time? It is clear that no-one should fear persecution, 
but can family violence or extreme poverty in one’s home country in some cases 
constitute persecution or degrading treatment? Degrading treatment is prohibited, 
but how many days in solitary confinement reach the level of severity to constitute 
inhuman or degrading treatment?  The abstract language of human rights cannot 
provide us with answers to these questions, or determine our choices in practice. 
We have to look beyond rights to the context, to the decisions of monitoring bodies 
and to society at large. Human rights articles and principles may represent goals, 
towards which governments and administrations try to move, but in practice it is 
also necessary to look at policy considerations: what is fair and reasonable in a given 
concrete situation, what works in this or that context, and in what kind of community 
4 David Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?”, European Human 
Rights Law Review, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 245-266.
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do we want to live?  But is this type of political manoeuvring and prioritising not 
something that universal and inalienable human rights should prevent?  
As to the theoretical perspective on rights, there is, indeed, something very 
appealing in the idea that every person everywhere in the world, irrespective of 
citizenship, residence, race, culture, class, caste or community, is entitled to enjoy 
some universal and inalienable human rights standards which others should 
respect.5  The substance of these rights could be taken from the main human rights 
conventions.6 Indeed, many view human rights conventions, articles and principles 
as rather unproblematic tools which can give an expression to absolute and good 
values and “standards” that must in practice lie outside political calculations.  As 
I wrote in my article “Freedom of Religion”, abstract human rights can be seen as 
important because they are thought to offer us objective and non-political guidance 
in a complicated world.
In the same way, the abstract ideas of “human rights mainstreaming” and 
“human rights friendliness” have become popular management tools in legal bodies 
and governmental administrations. Human rights, and human rights principles as 
such, are often seen as something self-evidently progressive and unproblematic, an 
institution in the “fight against evil” as a senior human rights officer in the Council 
of Europe put it to me during a conference break.7   
According to Samuel Moyn: 
There is no way to reckon with the recent emergence and contemporary 
power of human rights without focusing on their utopian dimension: 
the image of another, better world of dignity and respect that underlines 
their appeal, even when human rights seem to be about slow and 
piecemeal reform. 8    
5 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), p.355.
6 Human rights are sometimes described as the “birthright of all human beings”. For more detailed analysis 
on the claimed properties of human rights, see Marek Piechowiak, “What are Human Rights? The Concept of 
Human Rights and their Extra-Legal Justification”, in Raija Hanski and Markku Suksi (eds.), An Introduction 
to the International Protection of Human Rights. A Textbook (Institute for Human Rights (Åbo Akademi 
University, 1999), pp. 3-14, (seond edition). 
7 According to Costas Douzinas, “Human rights are the fate of postmodernity, the energy of our societies, the 
fulfilment of the enlightenment promise of emancipation and realization. Human rights are the ideology 
after the end, the defeat of ideologies, or to adopt a voguish term, the ideology of globalisation at the ‘end 
of history’”. Douzinas has claimed that the concept of human rights unites left and right, the pulpit and 
the state, the Minister and the rebel, the developing world and the liberals of Hampstead and Manhattan. 
As he puts it, the idea of human rights is taken seriously and human rights are talked about favourably by 
politicians, academics, NGOs, parliamentarians, governments, interest groups representing everyone from 
sexual minorities to the disabled, journalists, columnists, chefs and osteopaths. See Costas Douzinas, “Six 
Theses on the End(s) of Human Rights”, in Finnish Yearbook of International Law (Kluwer Law International, 
2002), p. 201.
8 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 4. 
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Thus, from one perspective, as I show in more detail in section 4 below, human 
rights can be discussed as theoretical norms and ideals or as a form of critique (“I 
too should have these rights”), something that in this paper I call “human rights 
as theory”.
But while human rights can be looked at from a theoretical perspective, they are 
also used in practice as discussed in section 5. Analysing human rights mainly as 
theoretical concepts without any reference to practice or context - if that is possible 
- has a mainly academic interest. As Florian Hoffmann has argued, the idea of an 
abstract human right separated from context and purpose can become a “cliché” 
concept, because referring to abstract human rights or emphasizing their general 
value does not tell us whose preferences or ideas of justice the human rights are 
promoting, or what consequences the human rights have in practice. 9
Indeed, both historical and modern critics of rights – as also analysed in more 
detail in section 5 below – have claimed that, in practice, human rights can have 
both good and bad consequences, and that for that reason they have to be viewed 
critically and pragmatically. Karl Marx, for example, claimed that the rights of man 
are yet another political theology that mainly protects the possessive individual of 
a capitalist society.10 According to him, the human right to property is good for 
those who have property, but not so important to the poor. Some modern critics 
have underlined that, in practice, open human rights language does not provide 
us with clear standards or principles, but instead defers to policy requirements. 
This can, of course, be good or bad, depending on the circumstances of the matter. 
Some cultural researchers have criticised the idea of human rights from different 
perspective. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted after 
World War II, some prominent cultural anthropologists criticised human rights as 
being a Western concept promoting Western interests; I elaborate on this in my 
article “Culture and Human Rights“. 
Some observers have stated that implementing human rights in practice 
rarely gets beyond being a masquerade for politics. States agree on human rights 
conventions, but it is also state bodies and their experts who in practice agree on 
the priority of rights, their “correct” interpretation, and the necessary action and 
resources required for their implementation. In addition to this, some critics of 
rights, as discussed below, particularly in section 5, have argued that when abstract 
rights are put into practice, they can become a hypocritical and bureaucratic state 
language which upholds power structures rather than really challenges them. 
9 See Florian F. Hoffmann, “Human Rights, the Self and the Other: Reflections on a Pragmatic Theory of 
Human Rights”, in Anne Orford (ed.), International Law and its Others (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
pp. 226-229.
10 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question” (1844), see 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/, visited December, 2011. 
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So, while theoretical ideas of universal human rights have an appeal, it is also 
necessary to ask what kind of practical consequences these rights have. What kind 
of support do abstract human rights commitments and norms offer, in practice, for 
individuals (refugees, minorities, the poor, the excluded, etc); how do rights operate 
in the professional sphere; and do human rights sometimes, as Anne Orford has 
claimed, constrain our capacity to think about and counter the ways power circulates 
in law and politics?11 For this reason, it is not enough to look at what human rights 
could be or ought to be at an abstract level, but also at how human rights are turned 
into governance and professional practice, and why human rights often end up 
supporting one set of positions or preferences instead of another. 
Looking at human rights from a critical perspective does not mean denying the 
good things human rights have achieved in practice. As David Kennedy has written, 
human rights have freed individuals from great harm, providing emancipatory 
vocabulary and institutional machinery for people across the globe. Human 
rights have functioned as a language in which experiences of injustice, suffering 
and violence are spoken of in such a way that they have gained general attention 
because it is a language that everyone understands. Human rights discourse and 
human rights conventions have provided a platform for advancing visions of good 
institutions and right practices.12  
But while human rights can do good things in practice, they can also have 
non-liberating, or even harmful, practical consequences. An abstract definition of 
family in human rights law is, in practice, valuable to those who are included in 
that definition but “bad” for those – sexual minorities, grandmothers of refugees, 
etc – who are excluded. Freedom of religion is good for those who practise their 
religion in line with Strasbourg case law (if that kind of line of cases can be found), 
but problematic or even harmful for those who have a different kind of definition 
for freedom of religion. Thus, in professional practice the claimed universality of 
freedom of religion might reveal a Western or institutional bias, or be conditioned 
by certain cultural ways of thinking of a good life; this is discussed in my article 
“Freedom of Religion”. Refugee law is especially beneficial for those who can meet 
the criteria of the definition of refugee, but not for those seeking asylum for other 
reasons. The human right to property is an important right, but when big companies 
start to buy land in Africa and to make reference to their “right to property”, it 
becomes clear that referring to human rights is not necessarily a progressive move 
towards a more just world. The building of institutions can also have negative 
practical consequences. Establishing a new human rights institution may sometimes 
11 Anne Orford, “Biopolitics and the Tragic Subject of Human Rights” in Elizabeth Dauphinee and Christina 
Masters (eds.), The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror (Palgrave, 2007), p. 205.
12 See David Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?”, European Human 
Rights Law Review, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 245-266.
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take resources away from more efficient NGOs, as a colleague from the Association 
for the Prevention of Torture (APT) reminded me in the Ukraine. In other words, 
implementing human rights law in practice is not a technical question, but a question 
about priorities, resources and political choices. 
One way to analyse the interplay between abstract rights and their practical 
realisation in a given context, is to look at their operation from a pragmatic 
perspective. I will elaborate on this perspective on human rights in section 6. 
Open or conflicting rights, for example, never remain so in practice, but are always 
interpreted or given content or an order of priority by a human rights expert, a 
treaty institution or another expert body. The pragmatic perspective does not aim 
to understand human rights in terms of what they could be in theory (as universal 
standards or a basis for democracy, for example), but instead aims to focus on the 
practical consequences of rights. How, for example, do abstract human rights in this 
or that context protect human beings against cruelty, oppression and degradation?13 
The pragmatic approach to human rights is concerned with the making of the legal 
choices that are always present in the operation of human rights.  
Can human rights law or human rights institutions sometimes offer false 
promises, by claiming to know what justice is and by saying that to promote justice 
in the world all you need to do is to adopt, implement and interpret human rights?14 
Ms Navi Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, for example, 
claimed in her opening statement to the 18th session of the Human Rights Council 
in Geneva that the “dire emergency in the Horn of Africa is both the product of 
devastating natural phenomena, and the failure of governments – individually and 
collectively – to meet their preventive and remedial human rights obligations.”15 
Could the African problems really be prevented if governments implemented human 
rights conventions?16 What would that mean in practice? 
From theoretical perspective, one could say that every practical consensus in the 
field of human rights, appears to be a stabilisation of something essentially unstable. 
This can be good (for those who in practice benefit from the interpretation), but 
consensus can also be risky (for those who are excluded), since stability can mean 
13 “When human rights are honoured and enforced, they are effective instruments to protect individuals from 
abuse, cruelty, oppression, degradation and  the like” Michael Ignatief, Human Rights as politics and idolatry 
(Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. x and xi.
14 See, for example, David Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?”, 
European Human Rights Law Review, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 245-266.
15 Opening statement by Navi Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, 13 
September 2011. In the file of the author.
16 Could the human rights system be creating poverty? There are researchers who have argued that international 
law must also be seen in terms of establishing the conditions for impoverishment, and even of fostering it. 
Thus the international human rights system may contribute not so much to the reduction of poverty but 
more to its production. See Susan Marks, “Human Rights and the Bottom Billion”, European Human Rights 
Law Review, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 37-49.
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that politics and ethics are no longer considered.17 A decision or an expert opinion 
based on human rights, can create a false sense of harmony and hide the arbitrary, 
political or even irrelevant nature of that decision. When abstract rights encounter 
power and practice, human rights might turn out to protect particular (political, 
economic, institutional, religious, or fundamental) interests and values while leaving 
other interests in darkness.    
So maybe a clearer sense of choice and freedom at the moment of decision in 
the practical application of human rights is needed? As David Kennedy puts it: 
There is a freedom here – the freedom of discretion, of deciding in 
the exception, a human freedom of the will. It is at once pleasurable 
and terrifying. It entails responsibility to decide for others, causing 
consequences that elude our knowledge but not our power.18
We can never be completely satisfied that we have made a good choice, since 
a decision in favour of one alternative is always to the detriment of the opposite 
decision. It is in this well-known tension between the theory and the practice of 
human rights that I try to discuss and position the seven articles of my thesis. 
As noted above, in professional practice, theory and practice fuse into one. 
Human rights are popular tools in the fight for strategic power precisely because they 
make it possible to incorporate abstract universalism with concrete particularism 
(as discussed in my article “European Asylum Policy”, for example). The power of 
rights lies in the ability to present every particular claim as a claim for universal 
human rights. In the same way, human rights lawyers can refer to abstract human 
rights, while being aware that in practice these rights can be invoked in support of 
almost any purpose or goal.
From the outset, I want to make one thing clear. I am not “for” or “against” human 
rights, but only interested in the conceptual problems that emerge with the use of 
rights language, both in my articles, and in this introduction to my articles. I think 
that we want to prevent human rights from becoming a cliché. For this purpose, 
17 See Chantal Mouffe,  The Democratic Paradox (Verso, 2009) at p. 136. 
18 David Kennedy, “Reassessing International Humanitarianism. The Dark Sides” in Anne Orford (ed.), 
International Law and its Others (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 151.  Compare this to Carl Schmitt 
who famously stated that “Sovereign is the one who decides on the exception”. See Carl Schmitt, Political 
Theology. Four chapters on the concept of sovereignty (The University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 5. Later, 
on page 36, he argues that “The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology. Only 
by being aware of this analogy can we appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas of the state 
developed in the last centuries”. Compare Chantal Mouffe who talks about the “moment of decision” which 
characterizes the field of politics. According to her, this has serious consequences, since it is precisely those 
decisions – which are always taken in an uncertain terrain – which structure hegemonic relations. The 
decisions have an element of force and violence that can never be eliminated and cannot be adequately 
apprehended through the sole language of ethics or morality.  See Chantal Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, p. 
130.
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more sensitivity to human rights norms, as well as to their practical consequences 
is needed. 
Indeed, in any society governed by the rule of law, where human rights are often 
mentioned in the administration of justice, it is important to learn to look at the 
problems of rights. It is necessary to analyse human rights, not in devotional terms 
such as truth or religion, but as a practice that has strengths and weaknesses, winners 
and losers, and costs and benefits. In my experience, human rights practitioners, 
civil servants and so-called human rights experts too often stop short of considering 
the practical downsides or negative aspects of their enthusiasm for the good things 
about human rights, because the “promotion of human rights” seems so obviously 
beneficial. 
Can human rights practitioners or human rights institutions, national or global, 
even become blind to the problem of rights we discussed above? Can good-hearted 
and well-intentioned people also go wrong when they work to promote human 
rights? This can only be discussed in context, but many concerned with the protection 
of human rights may feel reluctant to evaluate human rights systems, human rights 
institutions and human rights bureaucracies pragmatically, fearing that such a 
critical look may reduce the advances made by human rights in promoting a “better 
world”.   
In contrast, in a private context – in lunch hours, corridors, and free time – 
one does hear critical and sceptical views on the real practical meaning of human 
rights jargon, or the real practical benefits of human rights institutions. As David 
Kennedy has written, human rights deal with appealing ideas, but when translated 
into governance, they also create costs; however, we discuss the dark sides only 
privately, often cynically, and rarely strategically.19  
19 See David Kennedy, “Reassessing International Humanitarianism: The Dark Sides”, In Anne Orford (ed.) 
International Law and its Others (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 133. 
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3 key ConCePts
Before starting to discuss human rights as a theory and practice in more detail, a few 
more words need to be said about concepts like “human rights”, and “dark and bright 
side of rights”, that are used in this introduction. I have no difficulties in agreeing with 
Costas Douzinas, who has pointed out that the term human rights has a wide scope 
and undetermined meaning. He writes that “human rights” encompasses multiple, 
diverse and even conflicting practices and discourses. 20 Human rights denotes, for 
example, a diverse group of constitutional, legal, judicial, academic and popular 
texts and commentaries; legal, political and cultural institutions and practices at 
domestic, regional and international levels using human rights as their organizing 
principle; governmental and non-governmental agencies working around human 
rights; the personnel working in these institutions; diverse campaigns, groups and 
organisations at various levels; the people involved in them; and multiple situations, 
events and people who use the term in order to describe or evaluate these situations. 
Douzinas’ wide definition of human rights is also suitable for my purposes.
What, then, do I mean by the dark and bright sides of human rights? As 
already discussed in previous section, human rights are simultaneously an abstract 
system and a practice. In abstract discussions, human rights are sometimes said 
to be universal, inalienable and equal. Human rights are said to create standards, 
vocabularies and institutions to free human beings from different kinds of harm and 
oppression. Human rights conventions and principles are regarded as valuable, and 
often rightly so, because they can sometimes in practice protect the dignity, agency, 
and freedom of human beings.  Human rights law can give us access to national and 
international human rights institutions, and provide humanitarians with advocacy 
tools, vocabulary and resources to challenge oppressive governments, etc.
This type of “romantic” narrative of human rights is not wrong, but it is inadequate. 
When we look at human rights in practice, it is easy to see that indeterminate and 
conflicting rights often defer, in different ways, to policy considerations as discussed 
in section 5.  Human rights can serve powerless, but they can also serve those who 
have power.   When abstract rights are used in practice, they may start to support 
either “good” or “bad” priorities or values, depending on one’s perspective on the 
matter.  For example, human rights law is not only for peace, as rights language can 
also in practice be used to justify military operations. Is this type of use of human 
rights good or bad? The bright side for one person can be the dark side for another. 
20 On different usages of human rights, see Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire. The Political Philosophy of 
Cosmopolitanism (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), pp. 8-13.
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On an abstract level human rights look value-neutral, fundamental, universal and 
inalienable, but in practice they may promote existing privileges, or create costs 
for those who are excluded from their “established” meaning. This is discussed in 
“Shadows in Paradise” or “Freedom of Religion”, for example. 
I do not think that the dark and bright sides of rights are separate aspects or 
permanent features of human rights, but different and, in many ways, related, 
context-bound and changing aspects and understandings of the practical operation 
of human rights. Thus, in my discussion of the dark and bright sides of human rights, 
I do not refer to exclusive but to relational aspects of human rights, permanent 
or changing arguments that can or should keep the discussion on the practical 
meaning of human rights alive. 
If we think that human rights only promote good consequences in practice, 
and that the main challenge is for everyone to have these rights, we might end up 
with a clichéd concept of rights. But if we only look at the bureaucratic or negative 
consequences of rights, we might end up with human rights cynicism.  In practical 
human rights work one should avoid both these traps. Implementing human rights 
norms in professional practice is about making one interpretation, or one kind of use 
of human rights become “correct”. It is precisely in these particular contexts or cases 
that a pragmatic evaluation of human rights – discussed in more detail in section 
6 - can draw our attention to the possible dark and bright sides of human rights. 
But before exploring the dark and bright sides of human rights practice further, 
it is necessary to say a few words about the theoretical qualities that are claimed for 
human rights (human rights as theory). Human rights as “universal” rights that can 
provide “standards” are also discussed in my articles “Culture and Human Rights”, 
“Prohibition of return” and “OPCAT article”. 
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4 human rights as universaL,  
 inaLienabLe anD equaL rights 
The value of human rights is often linked to the universal, inalienable and equal 
nature that is claimed for them, to the role of human rights in democratic decision-
making and to the meaning of human rights “standards” for developing just 
societies.21 As these abstract qualities of rights are also discussed in my articles, it 
is necessary to examine these theoretical perspectives in more detail.  
First of all human rights are sometimes claimed to be “universal”, that is, to 
belong to each and every human being, no matter what she or he is like. The Charter 
of the United Nations, for example, commits the United Nations and all member 
states to action promoting “universal respect” for, and to observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
was also proclaimed as a common standard of achievement for “all peoples and all 
nations”. Universality of rights – discussed in my “Culture and Human Rights” – is 
often rooted in the inherent dignity of the human being.  Human rights are said 
to be inherent rights that exist independently of the will of an individual human 
being or of any group of people. As human rights are neither obtained nor granted 
through any human action, they belong universally to every individual.22 
The rights which derive from the inherent dignity of human beings are also 
said to be “inalienable”. According to the preamble to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, for example, human rights are “inalienable rights” of all members 
of the human family, and thus a foundation for freedom, justice and peace in the 
world. Inalienability means that nobody can deprive anybody else of these rights, 
and nobody can renounce these rights himself. In this approach, human rights are 
21 Klaus Günther has stated that the strength of human rights language lie in their ability to make people sensitive 
to the voices of those human beings who suffer from pain and humiliation or who live with fear, and who reject 
it as injustice. This approach links the core meaning of human rights to something of negative universality. 
It is the universality of recognition of those “who suffer now or in the past from deliberate infliction of pain, 
humiliation, and fear, and who have reason to reject it as injustice.” See Klaus Günther, “The Legacies of 
Injustice and Fear: A European Approach to Human Rights and their Effects on Political Culture”, in Philip 
Alston (ed.)  The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 125. Secretary General of United 
Nations claimed in his inaugural speech at the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights that human 
rights constitute a “common language of humanity”. See Boutros Boutros Ghali, The Common Language of 
Humanity, at the UN World Conference on Human Rights, The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action 
(1993).
22 See Marek Piechowiak, “What are Human Rights? The Concept of Human Rights and their Extra-Legal 
Justification”, in Raija Hanski and Markku Suksi (eds.), An Introduction to the International Protection of 
Human Rights. A Textbook (2nd edition). Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, 1999) pp. 
3-14, at p. 6. According to Piechowiak, human rights are also claimed to be indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated, but it is not necessary in this paper to discuss these abstract qualities of human rights. 
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not related to duly adopted legal norms, but, instead, the adoption of the appropriate 
norms is postulated to protect human rights, and to determine how they are realised. 
In other words, positive legal norms do not establish human rights but guarantee 
them. This idea refers back to natural law: we possess rights “naturally”; they are 
an automatic part of our humanness.23   
“Equality” is another major element of the traditional conception of human rights. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights famously states that all human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Equality means that no human beings 
are more important than other human beings. Equal dignity requires equal respect, 
equal protection and equal possibilities and means for development. However, 
equality does not necessarily mean equal treatment, as in practice differences in 
treatment are acceptable or even desirable (so-called positive discrimination) if 
there are well-grounded reasons justifying them. 
These theoretical qualities of rights – universality, inalienability, equality – are 
commonly discussed in popular human rights textbooks. One example is enough 
here. According to Jack Donelly, human rights are significant precisely because 
they are universal, inalienable and equal. These qualities, he thinks, enable them to 
regulate the fundamental structures and practices of political life. Human rights are 
universal rights in the sense that today, as Donelly puts it, we consider all members 
of the species homo sapiens as ‘human beings’ and thus as holders of human rights. 
He underlines that human rights are also inalienable rights: one cannot stop being 
human in spite of one’s human behaviour. Donelly argues that human rights are 
equal rights; one either is or is not a human being, and one therefore has the same 
human rights as everyone else.24 
Furthermore, Donelly claims that human rights take priority over other moral, 
legal and political claims. Rights inform us how to treat someone as a human being.25 
Human rights are valuable as they respond to the most important aspirations 
of individuals, families and groups. It is claimed that human rights realise the 
underlying moral vision of human nature.26 For Donelly, human rights are not just 
abstract values but call for realization in practice. Denying someone something that 
it would be right for him/her to enjoy in a just world is very different from denying 
23 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edition, Routledge, 1997), p. 209. 
24 Jack Donelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 1.
25 Ibid., p. 1. Compare to Päivi Leino-Sandberg who has observed that: “The starting point of most human 
rights literature is the claim of the universal validity of human rights. It is believed that because human 
rights and the human condition are universal, and despite diverse decisive social elements ’all of us want the 
same thing’.” See Päivi Leino-Sandberg, “Particularity as Universality. The Politics of Human Rights in the 
European Union”, The Erik Castren Institute Research Reports, 15 (2005), p. 38. For a general overview on 
the concept of human rights and the main universal and regional human rights instruments, see, for example, 
Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edition, Routledge, 1997), pp. 
209-221.
26 Jack Donelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 15.
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her something that she is entitled (has a “right”) to enjoy. We need human rights, 
Donelly points out, because they promote fundamental values like liberty, equality 
and security. Human rights are good, because they respond to the changing world, 
and to the practical suffering that exists.27  
In human rights literature, human rights are also sometimes divided into 
different generations. This division is not irrelevant when we discuss the practical 
implementation of abstract human rights norms. The distinction between civil rights, 
in the sense of individual freedoms from state interference (first generation), on the 
one hand, and social rights, in the sense of rights to claim welfare benefits from the 
state such as the right to work or the right to education (second generation), is a 
traditional one. A third generation of rights refers to more collective goods: the right 
to peace, the right to self-determination, the common heritage of mankind, the right 
to development, minority rights or the right to a clean environment, for example. 
It has been claimed, however, that the concept of successive generations of 
human rights which replace each other is unsound, because it in effect abolishes the 
concept of human rights as the basic rights of an individual human being. Moreover, 
it is often suggested that first generation of rights are “hard” and enforceable while 
second generation of rights are more “soft” and programmatic. This undermines 
their claimed inalienability and equality. With regard to the second generation of 
rights, it remains unclear how the “right to work”, for example, helps an individual 
to get a job. With regard to the so-called third generation of human rights, it is 
entirely unclear who is supposed to be the subject and who the object of the right 
to peace or to a clean environment. 28   
Thus, the above abstract ideals of human rights (universality, inalienability 
and equality) are problematic. For example, what is the practical meaning of 
universal and inalienable rights, if their practical implementation and prioritising 
is dependent on political decision-making and available resources? As Samuel Moyn 
has put it, “The rights of the poor is a hollow phrase”.29 When so-called universal 
27 Ibid., p. 40.  
28 In addition to this, Peter Malanczuk argues that national courts and international decision-making bodies 
can only effectively protect civil rights as freedoms from state interference. In the case of social and economic 
rights, binding decisions in individual cases are hardly ever available because the enforcement of this kind 
of right, as a rule, requires the allocation of finances and resources, and policy decisions by legislative and 
executive bodies. In the case of alleged third generation rights, there are no special enforcement procedures 
available at all, apart from the usual mechanism in inter-state relations. See Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s 
Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edition, Routledge), 1997, p. 9.
29 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 40. Hannah 
Arendt makes an interesting point about the rights of, say, illegal undocumented migrants, when she observes 
that, “The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or 
of equality before the law and freedom of opinion – formulas which were designed to solve problems within 
communities – but that they no longer belong any community whatsoever. Their plight is not that they are 
not equal before the law, but that no law exist for them: not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants 
even to oppress them.”  See Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, 1951), p. 295.
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and inalienable human rights are put into practice, their universality is easily lost. 
The professional practice of human rights law includes and excludes and gives 
priority to one interpretation or application of human rights over another possible 
interpretation or bias, as discussed in my articles “Shadows in Paradise”, “Freedom 
of Religion” and “European Asylum Policy”. Some observers of rights have stated 
that the abstract universal can be universal only to the extent that it “remains 
untainted by what is particular, concrete and individual”.30
What about the claimed equality of human rights? All human beings are said 
to be born free and equal in dignity and rights. But more interesting, in my view, 
is the practical meaning of this abstract equality. It is not easy to measure exactly 
how “equality of human rights” as an abstract commitment in practice protects 
those whose rights are most often violated, such as people who live in extreme 
poverty or conflict zones, or people who are victims of human trafficking. Surely, 
in some contexts, human rights language and institutions can be useful in seeking 
protection against these types of pain, injustice and humiliation as well, as I discuss 
in my article “Culture and Human Rights”. The abstract language of universal, 
inalienable and equal rights is, however, difficult to combine with the fact that in 
practice human rights can protect individuals only insofar as they belong to the 
community that wants to protect them.  
Another type of challenge to the universality, inalienability and equality of 
rights comes from those who claim that our current conceptions of human rights 
are not in fact universal but reflect Western bias; this is discussed in my articles 
“Culture and Human Rights”, “Human Rights and the Exotic Other” and “Freedom 
of Religion”.31  Already when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
was being drafted, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) expressed 
its famous criticism of that very idea.32 The AAA advised the UN to prepare a 
declaration of human rights that took into consideration not only the rights of 
30 See Judith Butler, “Restating the Universal” in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavov Zizek (eds.), 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (Verso 2000), p. 23. Butler 
also observes that “the abstract requirement of universality produces a situation in which universality itself 
becomes doubled: in the first instance it is abstract; in the second it is concrete” (p. 17) and “abstraction is 
thus contaminated precisely by the concretion from which it seeks to differentiate itself” (p. 19).
31 In an interview (23.1.2009) Bob Geldof pointed to the apparent paradox at the heart of human rights: rights 
are Western but the West considers them universal. He said that “we cannot impose our ideas to other 
people”. www.guardian.co.uk, accessed 5.12.2010. 
32 American Anthropological Association: ‘Statement on Human Rights’ reprinted in American Anthropologist 
(4/1947).  See also Dianne Otto, “Everything is Dangerous: Some Post-structural Tools for Rethinking the 
Universal Knowledge Claims of Human Rights Law”, Australian Journal of Human Rights 1, Vol 17, 1999. 
p. 2-4. At that time another challenge to the claimed universality of human rights was from the group of UN 
member states who abstained from voting for the adoption of the UDHR.  Saudi Arabia, one of those who 
abstained, underlined the basic legal and philosophical differences between the Islamic tradition and the 
approach of the UDHR. The early opposition of communist states, who formed the majority of the abstainers, 
saw civil and political rights as Western and capitalist concepts. 
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individuals, but also the culture of individuals.33 The AAA felt at that time that the 
idea of the universality of human rights was an imperialistic project that must be 
opposed.34 American Anthropological Association stated that the rights of the man 
in the twentieth century cannot be circumscribed by the standards of any single 
culture, and advised the UN to prepare a declaration of human rights that took into 
consideration not only the rights of individuals, but also their culture. 
This type of theoretical universalism-relativism debate has continued up to the 
present day.35 In the 1990s, political scientist Samuel Huntington stirred up a well-
known debate when he claimed that Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, 
constitutionalism, human rights and equality have little resonance in other cultures.36
In the same way, the universality of human rights has also been challenged by 
those observers who claim that the human rights concept is not in conformity with so-
called “Asian values”. This position rejects the globalisation of the “Western” human 
rights concept, and claims that Asia has a distinct set of values which provides the 
basis for a different understanding of human rights and thus justifies the “exceptional 
handling of rights” and rights holders by Asian governments. In the Bangkok 
Governmental Declaration, endorsed at the 1993 Asian Regional preparatory 
meeting for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, governments agreed 
that human rights “must be considered in the context of the dynamic and evolving 
process of international norm setting, bearing in mind the significance of national 
and regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds”. 
From this perspective, human rights are not inalienable or universal, but must 
reflect the cultural and other backgrounds of states and individuals.37 
33 Costas Douzinas has argued that “undoubtedly their [human rights’, JP] family tree is Western. Confucianism, 
Hinduism, Islam and African religions have their own approaches to ethics, dignity and equality – many 
of them similar to the Western version”. He thinks that non-Western philosophies and religions retain a 
stronger communitarian base with their emphasis on duties arising from strong social links, and were not 
part of the early development of the human rights movement. See Costas Douzinas, “Are Rights Universal?”, 
The Guardian, 11.3.2009, in www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree, accessed 5.12.2010.
34 Besides my article “Culture and Human Rights”, for a more detailed analysis see Jari Pirjola, “Human Rights 
and Cultural Relativism – Views to the Twenty-first Century” (in Finnish), Oikeus, no. 4, 1998, pp. 433-440. 
35 For example, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action noted that: “All human rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally 
in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. While the significance of 
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne 
in mind, it is the duty of the States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote 
and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” See A/Conf, 157/23, 12.7.1993, point 5.  
36 See Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilisations? The Debate” in Foreign Affairs (New York 1996). 
Huntington’s view is rightly criticised as essentializing  cultures and religions, but his contribution can also 
be read as an argument for a constructive politics of conflict that leaves behind the illusion of consensus in 
a plural world.
37 See Xiarong Li, “Asian Values and the Universality of Human Rights”, in Patrick Hayden (ed.), The Philosophy 
of Human Rights, Paragon Issues in Philosophy (Paragon House, 2001), pp. 397, 399-400. According to 
Xiarong Li, Asian views on human rights include claims like “the community takes precedence over the 
individual”; “social and economic rights take precedence over civil and political rights”; and “rights are a 
matter of national sovereignty”.
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The “Asian view” on human rights has been criticised by stating that there is 
no ground for believing that norms originating “elsewhere” should be inherently 
unsuitable for solving problems “here”. It is stated that such a belief leads to “genetic 
fallacy”, in that it assumes that a norm is suitable only to the culture of its origin. 
In other words human rights, under this criticism of the “Asian view”, should be 
protected, whether the idea for them originated in the West or in Asia.38 I have 
discussed this argument in my article “Culture and Human Rights”.
Moreover, some legal scholars have been sceptical about the ability of abstract 
human rights to construct universal, impartial and neutral standards at all, 
and they see human rights as synonyms for male, Christian and monotheistic 
perspectives.39 For example, the feminist critique of rights has argued that rights 
language is indeterminate and thus highly manipulable in both a technical and a 
more general way, and that rights may give a rhetorical flourish to an argument, 
but in practice provide only an ephemeral polemical advantage and thus obscure 
the need for political and social change. To assert a universal human right is to 
mischaracterise our social experience and to assume the inevitability of social 
antagonism by implying that social power rests in the state and state institutions, 
not in the people who compose the state.40 Women’s experiences and concerns, it is 
argued, cannot always be easily translated into the narrow, individualistic, language 
of rights. Rights discourse overly simplifies complex power relations, and their 
promise is constantly thwarted by structural inequalities of power. Some critical 
38 Ibid., p. 401. Xiarong Li argues that that the universal validity of the human rights concept can be confirmed 
in cross-cultural conversation. This “is a conversation that proceeds by opening those assumptions to reflection 
and re-examination. Its participants begin with some minimal shared beliefs: for example, that genocide, 
slavery, and racism are wrong. They accept some basic rules of argumentation to reveal hidden presuppositions, 
disclose inconsistencies between ideas, clarify conceptual ambiguity and confusions, and expose conclusions 
based on insufficient evidence and oversimplified generalisations. In such a conversation based on public 
reasoning, people may come to agree on a greater range of issues than seemed possible when they began. 
They may revise or reinterpret their old beliefs. The plausibility of such a conversation suggests a way of 
establishing universal validity: that is, by referring to public reason in defence of a particular conception or 
value.” (ibid., p. 407).
39 See, for example, Hilary Charlesworth, “Feminist Methods in International Law”, The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 93:361 (1999), at p. 392. 
40 See Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law, (Juris Publishing, 2000) p. 209 . On 
the other hand, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, for example, has suggested that the real challenge for feminism in the next 
century is to make sure that women’s human rights are universally respected and that the globalisation 
of feminism in practice trumps cultural relativism. She has written that, “Western feminists need to be 
suspicious of the celebration of cultural diversity unless they want inadvertently to celebrate polygamy, child 
marriage, marital rape, honour killings, wife beating, selective abortion of female fetuses and other traditions 
that are legitimized in the name of the culture. Passionate egalitarians need to broaden their agenda from 
socioeconomic issues and find courage to identify cultural factors that create not just material poverty but 
also intellectual poverty, cultural poverty and moral poverty.” She has also stated that demands for greater 
recognition of diversity, “multiculturalism” or faith-based agendas are no substitute for demands for equality 
and human rights. See Ayaan Hirsi Ali: “Women’s rights coexist with wrongs”, in The Weekend Australian, 
March 13-14, 2010.
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observers have argued that campaigns for “women’s legal rights are at best a waste 
of energy and at worst positively detrimental to women”.41 
It is acknowledged, however, that human rights language can certainly provide 
a framework and language for a debate on the basic values and concepts of a good 
society. In the same way Pragna Patel has observed that “for most women within 
minority communities, in the absence of internal democratic and accountable 
mechanisms for resolving disputes, the legal system becomes an indispensable 
tool in the struggle for freedom. It is not luxury but it is necessity.”42 
From the pragmatic point of view, the origin and abstract qualities (universality, 
Western origin, monotheistic or male nature, etc.) of human rights are irrelevant. 
Human rights are useful if in practice they can provide protection against oppression 
and pain. The fact that the human rights movement has a specific cultural or 
historical origin, says nothing unless  Western origin renders human rights less 
useful.  This can, of course,  be the case: for example, the definition of refugee in 
the Geneva 1951 Refugee Convention links the need for international protection 
to the individual’s circumstances in a way that in practice can  also be harmful to 
the protection seeker as discussed in “Shadows in Paradise”. 
As I noted at the outset of this synthesis (section 2), human rights operate in 
two different but connected worlds.  Interestingly, a discussion on the meaning 
of human rights can often, in different contexts (academic, professional, human 
rights activism, etc) and societies, start either from abstract and theoretical ideas of 
human rights or from practical needs emerging from the community. In practice the 
same content or understanding of human rights may be argued or justified from a 
theoretical assumption about rights (the idea that rights are universal, inalienable, 
equal,  ahistorical and based on equality, for example) or from an association of 
human rights with utilitarian or practical cost/benefit calculations of the community. 
Often theoretical as well as practical or policy modes of justification may be discussed, 
and these may be seen as complementary or mutually supportive. Freedom of speech 
may be justified by a claim that it is a universal and inalienable human right inherent 
in human dignity. But it can also be justified as good policy (instead of being claimed 
as an “inalienable right”) that can contribute to the wellbeing and development of 
societies.43 Human rights do indeed operate in two interconnected worlds. 
41 See Hilary Charlesworth, “Feminist Methods in International Law”, The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 93:361 (1999), at p. 392.
42 Pragna Patel, “Faith in the State? Asian women’s struggles for human rights in the U.K.” Feminist Legal 
Studies, Vol 16, 2008, pp. 9-36, at p. 23. 
43 On different understandings of rights, see Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International 
Human Rights in Context. Law, Politics, Morals, (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 490.
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4.1 HuMAn rIgHTS And deMOCrACy 
Human rights operate in the context of the legislative activities of States. Through 
legislation, rights become positive law and receive meaning and applicability. 
Through, legislation, also, conflicts between abstract rights are resolved and claims 
of rights are put in a hierarchical order of preference. All this, however, tends to 
undermine the universality, inalienability and equality of rights. Are rights mainly 
a legislative construction? If rights depend on democratic, legislative processes – 
then they must differ between different communities.
Political philosophy and political theory has sought to analyse the relationship 
between rights and democracy, or more specifically, the relationship between 
abstract right and concrete political decision. 44 
One way to articulate trust in theoretical human rights language, is to see human 
rights as “trumps” that help us to formulate right decisions and guide us through 
multicultural and morally plural societies. Ronald Dworkin’s well-known thesis 
on the “rights as trumps”, for example, is aimed at limiting the administrative 
and political discretion of authorities and courts for the benefit of rights holders. 
From this perspective human rights are thought to be non-political, universal and 
absolute – in other words, independent of time and place, and beyond political 
controversy. They precede legislation and establish limits to what may be done by 
even democratic legislatures. This lifts them outside democratic decision-making, 
and poses the question of the relationship of rights to democracy. In conflict, which 
side should win? 
John Rawls seeks to resolve the problem by situating rights as the foundation 
of acceptable social order. A political order, he claims, is not only about fulfilling 
utilitarian needs or preferences. The principle of rights limits what may become 
acceptable objectives of legislative action. Rights, including equal liberty, impose 
restrictions on what are reasonable aspirations for the good life. 
Rawls defines the meaning of rights by stating that:
In justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good. A just 
social system defines the scope within which individuals must develop 
their aims, and it provides a framework of rights and opportunities and 
the means of satisfaction within and by the use of which these ends may 
be equitably pursued.45 
44 See for example, Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton 
University Press, 2002). In her book, Benhabib, drawing from Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls, discusses 
how a liberal democracy based on universal human rights could be realized in a multicultural world.
45 For more detailed analysis, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 28.
28
Rawls’ theory as such can, of course, be criticised for being a formalistic and 
alienating theory of liberal society. The idea that principles of justice are agreed behind 
a “veil of ignorance” of individuals’ particular characters, abilities, desires, cultures, 
religions and histories, is claimed to be an ideological fiction. It does not view people 
in the world – in practice – with their different cultures, lifestyles and worldviews, 
but as abstract concepts that have been emptied of any definitive background.46
One theoretical and also critical interpretation regarding the significance of 
human rights in modern democratic societies is provided by Jurgen Habermas.47 
Habermas has written that individual rights make up the core of modern legal 
orders. As we can no longer ground the legitimacy of a legal order in a religiously or 
metaphysically grounded natural law, Habermas advises us to turn to two concepts: 
popular sovereignty and human rights. The principle of popular sovereignty 
lays down the procedures, such as rights of communication, which justify the 
presumption of a legitimate outcome. Human rights, by contrast, give the grounding 
of an inherently legitimate rule of law. Human rights guarantee the life and private 
liberty – that is, scope for the pursuit of personal life plans – of citizens. 
Habermas asks what basic rights free and equal citizens must mutually accord 
one another, if they want to regulate their common life legitimately by means of 
positive law. This approach to the drafting of a constitution links popular sovereignty 
to the creation of rights. Human rights then provide one key perspective from 
which the enacted laws can be legitimated as a means to secure both the private 
and the civic autonomy of the individual.48 Habermas is, however, aware of the 
tension between the “universal meaning of human rights and the local condition of 
their realisation”,49 but for him the solution to this tension seems to be the global 
expansion and respect of human rights. In other words, all existing states could 
either be transformed into constitutional democracies or each individual should 
attain the “effective enjoyment of human rights immediately, as a world citizen.  In 
this sense, article 28 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights refers to 
a global order in which the rights and freedoms set out in this Declaration can be 
46 See Martti Koskenniemi, “The Effect of Rights on Political Culture”, in Philip Alston with Mara Bustelo and 
James Heenan (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 104.
47 Jurgen Habermas, “Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights” in Jurgen Habermas, The Postnational 
Constellation. Political Essays (ed. and translated by Max Pensky) (Polity, 2001), p. 114.
48 Ibid., pp. 114-116. 
49 Ibid., pp. 118-119. Habermas argues that, “Thus a peculiar tension arises between the universal meaning of 
human rights and the local conditions of their realization – but how is that to be achieved? On the one hand, 
one can imagine the global expansion of human rights in such a way that all existing states are transformed 
– and not just in name only – into constitutional democracies, while each individual receives the right to 
nationality of his or her choice. (---) An alternative route would emerge if each individual attained the effective 
enjoyment of human rights immediately, as a world citizen”.
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fully realized, but even the goal of an actually institutionalized cosmopolitan legal 
order lies in the distant future.”50
But Habermas, of course, is also aware of the tension between theory and practice, 
and the possibility of false universality, and he observes that:
Nevertheless, the general validity, content, and ranking of human 
rights are as contested as ever. Indeed, the human rights discourse that 
has been argued on the normative terms is plagued by the fundamental 
doubt about whether the form of legitimation that has arisen in the West 
can also hold up as plausible within the frameworks of other cultures. 
The most radical critics are Western intellectuals themselves. They 
maintain that the universal validity claimed for human rights merely 
hides a perfidious claim to power on the part of the West.51 
At least in the light of my examples above, Dworkin, Rawls and Habermas discuss 
human rights as rather abstract conditions for the legitimate government of modern 
democratic societies. This kind of understanding of rights was also very much my 
perspective on human rights in “Culture and Human Rights”, for example, which 
discussed the role of human rights in a multicultural context. The key argument 
of the article was that the culture concept, or so-called Western origin of human 
rights, cannot as such challenge the value of human rights language. Even in a 
multicultural context, human rights language can open up political culture for 
experiences of fear and injustice. 
So what Dworkin, Rawls and Habermas are saying is that if we want to live in 
a democratic state, the task of the state can only be realised within the limits of 
respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. In this model, rights are foundational 
for acceptable political society. There is no conflict between rights and democracy 
because democracy is based on rights and seeks to guarantee their fulfilment in 
actual social context.
But the idea that human rights are a kind of higher law that prevails over 
national politics, is of course a problematic one, as it is precisely states and 
50 Ibid., p.119.
51 Habermas continues that the “so called equal rights may have only been gradually extended to oppressed, 
marginalised, and excluded groups. Only after tough political struggles have workers, women, Jews, Romanies, 
gays, and political refugees been recognised as “human beings” with a claim to fully equal treatment. The 
important thing now is that the individual advances in emancipation reveal in hindsight the ideological 
function that human rights had also fulfilled up to that time. That is, the egalitarian claim to universal validity 
and inclusion had also always served to mask the de facto unequal treatment of those who were silently 
excluded. This observation has aroused the suspicion that human rights might be reducible to this ideological 
function. Have they not always served to shield the false universality – imaginary humanity, behind which 
an imperialistic West could conceal its own way and interest?”  Ibid, p. 119-120.
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state institutions that in practice are the guardians of human rights.52 It is true 
that, in a liberal democratic society, limits are always put on the exercise of the 
sovereignty of the people. Those limits are usually presented as providing the 
very framework for the respect of human rights and thus as being non-negotiable. 
But in fact they depend on the way indeterminate human rights are defined 
and interpreted at a given moment.53 In other words, democratic politics give 
meaning to human rights. 
In practice, human rights and democracy can frequently be in conflict with each 
other. For example, democratic logic always entails drawing a frontier between “us” 
and “them”. It is possible to agree through a democratic procedure that certain 
minorities or foreigners are excluded from certain rights. Thus, no final solution 
can be found to the tension described above between human rights and democracy. 
There can only be temporary, pragmatic and unstable negotiations of the tension 
between them. 
According to Chantal Mouffe, both Habermas and Rawls claim to have found 
the solution to the problem of the compatibility of liberty and equality which has 
accompanied liberal democratic thought since its inception:
Their solutions are no doubt different, but they share the belief that 
through adequate deliberative procedures it should be possible to 
overcome the conflict between individual rights and liberties and the 
claims for equality and popular participation. According to Habermas 
such a conflict ceases to exist once one realizes the ‘co-originality’ of 
fundamental human rights and of popular sovereignty. However, 
as I indicate, neither Rawls nor Habermas is able to bring about a 
satisfactory solution since each of them ends up by privileging one 
dimension over the other: liberalism in the case of Rawls and democracy 
in the case of Habermas.54
But democracy (based on rational deliberation by Rawls or Habermas) should 
not hide the conflict between human rights and democracy, but should provide an 
arena where differences and conflicts can be confronted. Martti Koskenniemi has 
expressed this paradox as follows: “If we assume the existence of a set of objective 
(descending) fundamental rights, then we have moved beyond liberalism. If we 
52 Costas Douzinas, “Are Rights Universal”, The Guardian 11.3.2009, in www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree, 
accessed 5.12.2010. 
53 See Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (Verso, 2009), p. 4. 
54 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (Verso, 2009), p. 8. See also Juha Lavapuro, Uusi Perustuslakikontrolli 
(In English: The New Constitutional Review), Suomalaisen Lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja, a-sarja n:o 301 
pp. 142-146. 
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deny their existence, we cannot achieve the reconciliation between freedom and 
social order. The former is constantly in danger of being devoured by the latter”.55
The solution for this dilemma has been the formal and abstract nature of human 
rights as discussed above. It is easy at an abstract level to agree that everyone should 
have “human rights”, for example, but very difficult to agree what this means in 
practice. Abstract rights can also impoverish political discourse, as complex and 
sensitive practical issues may not easily translate into “rights language” without loss 
of meaning. The scope of human rights (freedom of religion or “non-refoulement”, 
for example) can only be negotiated in different ways; I tried to demonstrate this 
in “Freedom of Religion” and “Shadows in Paradise”.   
4.2 TOwArdS PrACTICe: HuMAn rIgHTS AS ruLeS,  
 STAndArdS And InSTITuTIOnS
When human rights are translated from abstract principles into legislation or 
policy, this takes place through making this language more concrete - in practice 
by translating these abstract demands in more determined rules or standards. In 
practice, legal norms differ in extent to which they constrain those who are charged 
with applying them.
It is customary to distinguish between rules (apply either/or fashion) and 
principles (apply more or less fashion). Rules are constraining and rigid, and must 
be followed if they are applicable in the case. Principles, on the other hand, do not 
determine the solution of the case, but brings out arguments in favour of one solution 
or another.56 Principles leave open the possibility that also other consideration may 
be relevant to the decision.
55 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 85.
56 Martin Scheinin has elaborated on this aspect of human rights by suggesting that human rights can operate, 
for example, as rules or principles, directly or indirectly (as an interpretative aid) or as “norm fragments” or 
standards that can provide interpretative assistance for the interpretation of human rights norms. Scheinin 
has argued that the operation of human rights norm in a concrete legal decision may vary. For example, a 
decision on the applicability of a rule authorizing expulsion of a foreigner, may be followed by the weighting 
of reasons for and against the expulsion. In order to cover these different ways of application of human rights 
norms, the concepts of rule effect and principle effect are used in this study. They refer to the distinction 
between rules and principles but, at the same time avoid the simplification of treating the human rights 
provision as a rule or principle in itself. Rules and principles applied in concrete cases are concrete norms 
formulated on the basis of the whole legal order. Principles, on the other hand, are legal norms of a “more or 
less” character. In their application the crucial issue is to define the weight of principles and to optimize the 
application of each of them. Since principles do not conflict, the different principles can be weighed against 
each other, and even the principles that lose out in this process remain legal norms which are relevant in the 
case. Scheinin suggests that rules and principles must be formulated on the basis of “the whole legal order”. 
Human rights can also operate as “standards” even though they are not formally applied in legal decisions. 
On how human rights can contribute to the application of legal norms, see Martin Scheinin, Ihmisoikeudet 
Suomen oikeudessa (Human Rights in Finnish Law) (Gummerus, 1991), (A Study in Constitutional Law of the 
Domestic Validity of International Human Rights Treaties and the Applicability of Human and Constitutional 
Rights in the Finnish Legal Order), at p. 28-29,  
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In this translation process, rights become more concrete but also more contestable 
and political. First, it is not clear how to deal with interpretative difficulties. For 
example, what does the prohibition of inhuman treatment or a right to the “freedom 
of religion” mean in practice? The translation of human rights language into practical 
measures is not a technical or automatic exercise. Second, it is not always clear what 
laws should be adopted to give effect to rights and how rights conflicts should be 
resolved. 57  Furthermore, there is a question of governance and bureaucracy. When 
rights are translated into the practice they do not only set limits but also create 
opportunities. Human rights language can promote, shape or prevent the conduct 
of wars, it can be debated in the context of climate change or good governance. 
And when rights are part of power and governance, they are not only tools for 
emancipation. They can also start to produce costs and restrictions. I will examine 
these questions in section 5 below. 
In the field of law, institutions (European Court of Human Rights, UNHCR, courts, 
ombudsmen, national human rights institutions, etc.) are empowered to produce 
interpretations (decisions, recommendations, positions, views, observations, etc.) 
to the problems that emerge when abstract human rights are transferred into the 
concrete practice.  To know the value of the human rights institution, it is necessary 
to know what kind of policies and priorities it will support in a particular matter. 
As human rights institutions use rights language and this language can be used for 
almost any purpose, it is not automatically clear that human rights institutions and 
bodies support the preferences and interpretations we want to support.
For example, applying abstract human rights “standards” or deciding between 
conflicting rights can mean promoting the preferences of the powerful (migration 
authorities, EU institutions, or human rights court, for example), instead of those 
who are in marginal positions or who are unrepresented in human rights or other 
decision-making bodies. The vocabulary of rights or the commitment for human 
rights does not always represents the interests of the powerless  but can also support 
the status quo or end up becoming a bureaucratic and institutionalised  language, 
a kind of empty phraseology.  This is discussed in “European Asylum Policy” and 
in “Freedom of Religion”. 
Indeed, human rights institutions often end up promoting their own priorities 
and preferences. They also operate in context and promote their policy priorities. 
For this reason, when we know what institution is getting together (humanitarian 
organisation, religious organisation, governmental organisation, expert committee, 
57 There is no doubt that the idea of human rights can also apply in a less formal way as an inspiration or as a 
requirement for a commitment to action. The general promotion of human rights “standards” or “principles” 
at an abstract level is often linked to the humanitarian will to do good, to remake the world fairly and to 
strengthen the hand of tolerance. The general call for abstract human rights is often a means by which 
lawyers, institutions and NGO activists attempt to constrain the power exercised by a state over individuals 
within its territory or jurisdiction.
33
etc.) we sometimes know in advance what their policy proposals will look like.  And 
there is necessarily nothing wrong about this type of bias.    As I write in “Shadows 
in Paradise”, human rights conventions do not in itself guarantee a consistent 
interpretation of the conventions or provide them with “correct” interpretations. 
For this reason, human rights institutions are needed to determine the meaning of 
rights in practice. However, interpretation of rights is a process which is influenced 
by a large number of different factors as I try to elaborate in “European Asylum 
Policy”, for example. 58  
In other words, if we look at human rights from an abstract and theoretical 
perspective, it is not difficult to speak of human rights rules, standards or institutions 
as something useful and rather unproblematic. But, as will be discussed in section 
5, when we start to translate rules and standards into concrete practical measures, 
the picture becomes more complicated. However, whether human rights or human 
rights institutions have good or bad consequences cannot be discussed in the 
abstract. For this reason, in the next section 5 I will look at rights in practice.  
Human rights as:
• universal, inalienable and equal rights
• democratic governance
• rules, principles and standards
• language of injustice and pain
• inspiration and commitmentT
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figure 1  Human rights as a theory as discussed in section 4. 
58 See Anne Orford, “Biopolitics and the Tragic Subject of Human Rights”, in Elizabeth Dauphinee and Christina 
Masters (eds.), The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror (Palgrave, 2007), p. 205.
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5 human rights in PraCtiCe 
I stated at the outset of this synthesis that when abstract rights are put to use in 
practice, they can have both liberating and disempowering practical consequences. 
Abstract rights can turn out to be empowering experiences for those whose rights 
and goals are respected in practice, but can be disempowering and non-liberating 
experiences for those whose rights and priorities are excluded. This dual aspect of 
human rights was, at a general level, well analysed in an article by Susan Marks on 
the UN World Conference on Human Rights which took place in Vienna in 1993.59 
She claimed in her article that the World Conference on Human Rights was both 
“a nightmare and a noble dream”. The nightmare, she writes, was that human 
rights had nothing to offer to the Bosnian women, the Tibetan Buddhist monk, or 
the Kurds who had come to tell of their suffering. It was a nightmare that human 
rights could make no difference in practice to the future of the families these people 
had left behind. 
According to Marks, it was a nightmare that the law and the institutions which 
are supposed to protect human rights are often in practice powerless to constrain 
the excesses of governments. The nightmare was that human rights could even 
operate counter-productively, by justifying abuses and defending the legal, social 
and political systems that produce or condone those abuses. In doing that, human 
rights are not only ineffective but also bad. 
On the other hand, the noble dream of the conference was that human rights 
could also sometimes, in real life, transform the lives of exiles mentioned above and 
their families, “empowering them in their respective struggles and simultaneously 
dissolving the objections, excuses and rationales of their oppressors.” It was the 
dream of human rights as the “ultimate norm of all politics”. The noble dream was 
that human rights could constrain abuses, provided only that the right treaties, 
monitoring organisations, implementation strategies and enforcement methods 
were put in place.60  
In other words, human rights language may sometimes just be an ideological 
cover for politics indifferent to the human condition, but human rights can also 
address the real causes of human suffering. What Marks tries to suggest is that, in 
practice, human rights can simultaneously be empowering and decisive but also 
deceiving and irrelevant.  On the one hand, human rights seem to be ineffective 
59 Susan Marks, “Nightmare and Noble Dream: The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights”, The Cambridge 
Law Journal, Vol 53, 1994, pp. 54-62. 
60 Ibid., p. 54. 
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and there should more rights. On the other hand, human rights are irrelevant and 
there seem to be too many of them.  
These two perspectives on rights – or tension between dream and reality, 
described by Marks – are also discussed in my seven articles. Human rights can 
be a useful and empowering language when plural societies are discussing the rules 
of co-existence, for example (see my “Culture and Human Rights”). But human 
rights can also be rather ineffective tools in practice to restrict the necessary policy 
choices made by states (as I discuss in “European Asylum Policy”). 
As I write in my article “Shadows in Paradise”, the human rights language of 
international conventions gives people crossing national frontiers a comprehensive 
and absolute promise of international protection. But when we assess this promise 
in concrete situations, the commitment to protection is no longer so clear. The 
tension between abstract human rights and their practical realisation leaves room 
for legal and political manoeuvring and creativity by states. In professional practice, 
the universal human rights language includes and excludes by referring to the same 
human rights language. The promise of “freedom of religion” might, in practice, 
reveal a Western bias or be conditioned by certain cultural or Christian ways of 
thinking of a good life or of the right way to practise religion; I discuss this in 
“Freedom of Religion”. In the same way, new human rights institutions, like National 
Preventive Mechanisms, discussed in my article “OPCAT Article” can be good on 
paper, but the real meaning of human rights mechanisms can only be evaluated 
in practice.   
But before further discussion of the dark and bright sides of human rights 
in practice, it is necessary to say a few words about the so-called early critics of 
rights who also noticed the tension and interplay between rights and their practical 
realisation.  
5.1 eArLy CrITICS Of rIgHTS
The sharp contrast between the widespread use of the idea of rights and the 
intellectual scepticism about its conceptual soundness is not new.61 The early critics 
of rights language – among them Edmund Burke, Karl Marx and Jeremy Bentham 
– were already suggesting that human rights, or natural rights as they were called at 
that time, are not as powerful and significant as they claim to be. Critical discussion 
of the practical meaning of “rights” is of course nothing new, and many themes 
61 Amartya Sen writes that “the dichotomy remains very alive today, and despite persistent use of the idea of 
human rights in the affairs of the world, there are many who see the idea as no more than ‘bawling upon 
paper’”. See Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 
356. 
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of the early debates on rights are reflected in current critiques, including my own 
articles. This is why I briefly want to open up my analysis of human rights here 
from the point of view of the early critical stories of rights.   
The idea that political morality and social choice are based wholly or partly on 
some account of the rights of the human individual is a familiar theme in Western 
politics. This theme can be found, for example, in the theories of John Locke 
(1632–1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), in the moral and political 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), and in the constitutional innovations 
of the American and French Revolutions. But this idea of the power of rights has 
never gone unchallenged, however.62
Many of the most famous philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries saw the development of the rights rhetoric as a positive phenomenon 
for the development of just societies. Rights were seen as a means to construct a 
political order that would not be dominated by conflicts caused by the subjective 
values of political passion. Natural rights were seen to protect both absolutism as 
well as liberty.
In particular, the English philosopher John Locke and the eighteenth-century 
philosophers Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire developed ideas 
regarding the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed. 
As is well known, for example, John Locke saw that rights – rights to life, liberty and 
property – create a positive foundation for society, and could structure a political 
order that would not be dominated by civil war or tyranny. To better guarantee 
such rights, mankind has entered, through means of a contract, into society, and 
individuals have conceded some of their natural rights to the sovereign, together 
with the power to defend them. 
On the other hand, since the historical rights declarations of the eighteenth 
century it has also been suggested that human rights (or, at that time, natural rights) 
are not as powerful in practice as they claim to be.  Early critics of rights claimed that 
rights language carries with it a number of challenges, weaknesses and limitations. 
Jeremy Waldron has written that “just as the theories of natural rights and of the 
rights of man that developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are the 
ancestors of the modern idea of human rights, so the critiques of those theories 
that appeared in that period are the starting point of modern misgivings and the 
direction this idea is taking us in our moral and political thinking”.63
One of the major criticisms of the doctrine of natural rights was the fact that 
the list of natural rights varies, an observation that is also relevant for the current 
62 Jeremy Waldron, Theories of Rights, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 1.
63 See Jeremy Waldron, “Nonsense Upon Stilts”, Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen 
1987) p. 2 where he compares the differences between old and modern critiques of rights. 
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debate on human rights. It was unclear which rights are “natural rights”, where 
these rights originate and how to “discover” them.64 
The most famous and often cited critiques of natural rights are probably those of 
Edmund Burke (1729–1797), Karl Marx (1818–1883), and Jeremy Bentham (1748-
1832).65  It is useful to raise some of their themes here, and these are also considered 
in my articles, “Culture and Human Rights” and “European Asylum Policy”. 
Edmund Burke’s main criticism was that rights discourse suffers from 
metaphysical idealism and rationalism. He felt that their abstraction is their main 
weakness. He thought that effective rights are created by particular history, tradition 
and culture. Burke wrote: “I cannot stand forward, and give praise or blame to 
anything which relates to human actions, and human concerns, on a simple view of 
the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude 
of metaphysical abstraction”.66According to Burke,  government cannot be based on 
abstract theories but has to take into consideration the circumstances, context and 
chance – in other words the historical peculiarities of particular societies. According 
to Burke, rights are defective because their simplicity and plainness cannot match 
the messiness of life.67 Absolute and universal rights can blind the politician to the 
realities of the particular and concrete, turning him or her into a metaphysician 
and prophet full of rhetorical hyperbole but unable to rule.68  
Karl Marx’s contribution to the critique of human rights has been fundamental. 
As I write in my article, “Culture and Human Rights”, “Karl Marx criticised the idea 
of human rights and the French Declaration because the application of the rights of 
man propagates the rights of the selfish individual detached from the society and 
other people”. For Marx, rights promoted the narrow interests of the bourgeoisie 
and its dominance in society. Rights belong to the abstract universal man, but in 
64 On this discussion, see Margaret Macdonald, “Natural Rights”, in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), Theory of Rights, 
Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 31. 
65 Current criticism, which will be discussed later in more detail, is based on old critiques like those of Edmund 
Burke and Karl Marx. Criticism has expanded their views in new directions. According to Costas Douzinas, 
Burke and Marx offer the foundational critiques of rights. Douzinas interestingly claims that Burke’s position 
on rights and the role of the constitution still lurks behind contemporary debates on British parliamentary 
sovereignty, membership of the European Union and the introduction of a Bill of Rights”. He feels that 
Burke’s legacy is mixed but that it would not be inaccurate to say that all major later critiques of rights share 
some aspect of his position. See Douzinas, The end of human rights. Critical legal thought at the turn of the 
century ( Hart publishing 2007)pp. 147-157. 
66 See Edmund Burke, “Reflections on the Revolution in France”, at www.constitution.org/eb/rev_fran.htm, 
visited 21 January 2010.
67 “These metaphysic rights entering into common life, like rays of light which pierce into a dense medium, are, 
by the laws of nature, refracted from their straight line. Indeed in the gross and complicated mass of human 
passions and concerns, the primitive rights of men undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections that 
it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original direction. The nature 
of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity: and therefore no simple 
disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man’s nature, or to the quality of his affairs.” Ibid. 
68 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Hart, 2000), pp. 149-150.
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practice they promote the possessive individual of capitalism. The aim of human 
rights is to remove politics from society and depoliticize the economy. 69 
Marx noted the fact that rights to religion and property are especially protected 
by state institutions. He claimed that the practical application of man’s right to 
liberty is man’s right to private property.70 As Marx saw it “none of the so called 
rights of man, therefore, go beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a member of 
civil society – that is, an individual withdrawn into himself, into the confines of 
his private interest and private caprice, and separated from community”.71 Rights, 
he felt, which are often presented fraudulently as freedoms, in practice maintain 
social inequality and class domination. Rights of factual subordination are, however, 
made to appear to be like equality.72
To Marx the rights of man are yet another political theology where the state 
replaces religion. Human rights is “yet another personification of something 
transcendental over human-species-nature”.73 Human rights are formulated in such 
a way that it seems that everybody should profit from them. They are, on the one 
hand, presumed to exist naturally and to set limits to political power, and are, on the 
other hand, applied by those same authorities whose power they should limit.74 The 
problem with human rights, in Marx’s view, is that they cannot trump the authority 
of the state, since the jurisdiction over those rights and over the resolution of conflicts 
belongs to the state authorities. This is one of the paradoxes I explore in “Shadows in 
Paradise” and “Freedom of Religion”. States have committed themselves to uphold 
a human rights law the content of which they or their institutions decide. 
In his famous essay “Anarchical Fallacies”, Jeremy Bentham attacked the view 
that the object of government is the “preservation of the natural and imprescriptible 
rights of Man”. In his view, natural rights is simple nonsense, “nonsense upon stilts” 
in his often cited expression.75 Lawyers should not refer to utopian rights language 
69 In a current discussion, Immanuel Wallerstein draws from Karl Marx, who he follows in emphasizing 
underlying economic factors and their dominance over ideological factors in world politics. See, for example, 
his European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power (New Press, 2006). In this book he tries to demonstrate 
how the so-called universal values promoted by Western Europeans ever since the sixteenth century, be they 
Christian, democratic or scientific, were merely a justification for Western intervention around the world. 
These values are, in Wallerstein’s opinion, neither truly universal nor beneficial to humankind.
70 Ibid. 
71 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question” (1844), p.17, see 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/, visited December, 2011. 
72 Cf. Charlesworth and Chinkin, who have stated that: “It is also claimed that the only consistent function 
of rights has been to protect the most privileged groups in society”. See Charlesworth and Chinkin, The 
Boundaries of International Law, (Juris Publishing, 2000), p. 209 
73 Martti Koskenniemi, “What Should International Lawyers Learn from Karl Marx?”, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, Vol 17 (2004), p. 234. 
74 This is why human rights commitments do not effectively prevent the EU from carrying out appropriate 
policy choices in the field of asylum and migration, as I write in my article, “European Asylum Policy”.   
75 See Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies”, reprinted in Waldron, “Nonsense upon stilts, Bentham, Burke 
and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen 1987) pp. 46-76.
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to find out what the existing state of law is, and what – in the light of the demands 
of utility – the effects are of the operation of laws in society. 
Bentham felt that natural rights are “vague and declamatory generalities” 
which in practice  come into conflict with each other. Bentham was concerned 
that declarations of natural law would be a harmful substitute for effective 
legislation.76 For Bentham, rights were devoid of meaning, a kind of phraseology 
full of contradictions. Natural rights are full of expressions “which in themselves 
refer to nothing but which are nevertheless used as though they were meaningful, 
and assertions which at face value seem evidently false but which are nevertheless 
accepted and given legal effect in order to secure some desired outcome”.77 
Bentham’s views also seem to be relevant in the current context. In my article 
“Shadows in Paradise”, for example, I observe that “inhuman treatment” is a kind of 
open concept in international law which, in practice, must be filled with meaning by 
states, or by the European Court of Human Rights. In my article “European Asylum 
Policy”, I explore human rights as a kind of empty phraseology.  As I write there, 
open and abstract human rights commitments or rights language can only guide 
the development of migration and asylum policies in a limited way.  
It is clear, therefore, that the early promoters and critics of natural rights raised 
themes that are still relevant today in the discussion about the dark and bright 
sides of human rights. John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, saw 
that rights create a positive foundation for society.  They thought that rights could 
structure a political order that would not be dominated by civil war or tyranny, but 
they did not show the precise and objective scope of rights in practice, or how to deal 
with situations when there are disagreements on the scope of rights or when rights 
are in conflict. Locke did not question the concept of good in society, but took for 
granted his conception that it would be beneficial for all to obtain as much property 
as possible.78  Burke, Bentham and Marx, for their part, criticised rights language – 
its abstractness, openness, generality, contradictions, partiality, indeterminacy and 
political nature. These early critics were thus aware of the limitations of rights in 
practice, but paid less attention to the potential of rights language:  its possibility 
to empower individuals for change and increase the freedoms of individuals, or 
its normative and institutional potential for the promotion of more just societies.  
The idea of natural rights was soon transferred into the concept of human rights. 
During the twentieth century a large number of human rights treaties were made 
to protect individuals against various forms of injustice. The abolition of slavery, 
76 See Jeremy Waldron, “Nonsense Upon Stilts”, Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen 
1987)  p. 32. 
77 Ibid., p. 34. As noted by Waldron, Bentham was quite clear about the “political usefulness of rights talk”, see 
p. 36.  
78 John Locke, Tutkielma hallitusvallasta (Second Treatise of Government) (Gaudeamus, 1995), p. 26. 
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factory legislation, public education, trade unionism, universal suffrage, and the 
protection of refugees show that at least the idea of “rights” as something useful 
was not extinguished.79
5.2 MOdern CrITICS Of HuMAn rIgHTS 
Many current observers of human rights have also noted the paradoxes that relate to 
the practical operation of rights: their conflicting nature, open-endedness, political 
nature and hypocrisy, and the tension between abstract universalism and concrete 
particularism – themes that are particularly discussed in three of the articles in 
my thesis: “Freedom of Religion”, “Shadows in Paradise” and “European Asylum 
Policy”.80
Many critical observers have expressed their reservations about the shift away 
from pragmatic or utilitarian modes of political evaluation, noting the fact that we 
no longer ask what is in the interests of all, but instead what rights individuals are 
entitled to. Others, as discussed below, are alarmed about the individualism in this 
discourse at the expense of a proper awareness of community, solidarity and civic 
virtue in human life. Some are worried by the abstract and formalistic character 
of modern claims about rights. These misgivings “may be regarded as the shadow 
that is cast by the ascendancy of rights talk in modern political discourse”.81
Some feel that talking about human rights is somewhat useless. Alasdair 
MacIntyre, for example, has written that the truth is plain: there are no such rights 
(that is, no human rights, natural rights, or rights of man), and belief in them is 
at one with belief in witches and unicorns. According to him, the best reason for 
79 These changes were not the result of human rights, however, but rather a result of civic movements, as 
Samuel Moyn has stated. See, The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, 2010). 
According to Jeremy Waldron, “In the years that followed the publication of these works by Bentham, Burke 
and Marx, the theory of human rights suffered a decline, then a renewal. Its attractiveness as a touchstone 
of normative thought about politics suffered a decline in the nineteenth century with the rise of large-scale 
social theory (for example, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber)”, Waldron, “Nonsense upon stilts.” Bentham, Burke 
and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen 1987) , p. 151.
80 Adam Tomkins, for example,  (see Campbell, T., Ewing, K.D. and Tomkins, A., (eds.), Skeptical Essays on 
Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2001), distinguishes  three main variants of scepticism regarding 
human rights. First, there is scepticism concerning rights as such (which may lead to a communitarian 
approach stressing community values or the importance of political debate in a pluralist world). Secondly, 
there is scepticism about allocating a large political role (distributing values is, after all, a political task) to 
bodies of unelected, unrepresented and unaccountable judges. Thirdly, there is scepticism about the rights 
advocated: civil and political rights rather than economic or social rights, for example. Quoted from  Jan 
Klabbers, Sceptical Views on Human Rights (Book review), Nordisk Tidsskrift for Mennesseskerettigheter 
(Nordic Journal of Human Rights) Vol 21 (2003), pp. 206-210, at p. 209. 
81 Jeremy Waldron, “Nonsense upon stilts”. Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen, 1987), 
pp. 1-2. For a critical overview on the proliferation of rights language, see Carl Wellman, The Proliferation 
of Rights. Moral Progress or Empty Rhetoric? (Westview Press, 1999), pp. 1-38. Wellman argues that the 
recent proliferation of the language of rights has been harmful because it has devaluated that currency in 
public debate.
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asserting so bluntly that there are no such rights is precisely the same as the best 
reason we have for asserting that there are no witches and the best reason we have 
for asserting that there are no unicorns: every attempt to give good reasons for 
believing that there such rights has failed.82 
In the next section I will argue that human rights are not as powerful in practice 
as they claim to be when we look at them at an abstract level.  Human rights do 
not provide us with clear standards that could be followed in the administration 
of justice. That rights in practice often defer to policy requirements is, as such, 
neither good nor bad.  The effect depends on what kind of priorities and values 
are promoted when abstract rights are put into practice. 
5.3 IndeTerMInACy And rIgHTS COnfLICTS
Human rights language is notoriously indeterminate. It is clear that the interesting 
aspect of indeterminacy is not, however, that international legal words are 
semantically indeterminate or “open”. States have been able to agree on human 
rights precisely because they are indeterminate, and can operate in different contexts 
and support different kind of goals and values. Indeterminacy of rights language is 
interesting because open human rights concepts never remain open in practice – 
instead they are issued with content or are interpreted by referring to the values or 
preferences of the interpreting organ and in the context of the society where rights 
operate; I explore this in my article “Shadows in Paradise”. 
The interpretation of legal concepts is a process which is influenced by a large 
number of factors. What I mean is that when we know that someone has the 
right to enjoy human rights (freedom of religion, principle of non-refoulement, or 
freedom from persecution, for example), we know relatively little. The abstract right 
in question must be made specific in order to have practical meaning.  Making the 
right specific is not a “technical problem”, and does not emerge from the language 
of the right itself. Rights require meaning after the complex assessment of the 
context and premises of the right.  In other words, when an abstract human rights 
norm is put into practice this must be done in a concrete situation filled with 
meaning. Open and abstract expressions like “inhuman treatment” or “persecution” 
or “freedom of religion” or “right to work” bring with them questions regarding 
political and economic values (the inhuman treatment of which people we should try 
to prevent, for example) as well as interpretative controversies regarding “correct” 
and “appropriate” interpretations of these concepts and the practical actions or 
procedures needed. 
82 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (3rd edition, Notre Dame, 2007) p. 69.
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Certainly everyone agrees that nobody should be persecuted, but without 
supplemental work we cannot answer the question of what counts as “persecution”. 
For example, what kind of hardship (political, economic, environmental, war, 
terrorism, human trafficking, family violence, extreme poverty, etc.) is required, 
how often must the mistreatment occur to count as persecution, by whom can 
persecution be carried out, how can persecution be proved, should one seek help 
from other countries, and can private bodies persecute? If we know that no-one 
should be treated in a degrading manner, we do not know (from that human right 
norm alone) if returning a sick or very old asylum-seeker to his home country is 
degrading treatment.  Prisoners are, of course, entitled to freedom of religion, but 
does this include the right to wear a headscarf in prison? This type of interpretative 
question is nothing new or dramatic for lawyers who deal with international legal 
concepts, but the questions show that abstract human rights do not provide us with 
clear indicators as to how to answer problems that emerge in practice.  The practical 
implementation of human rights is about making choices not about technical or 
automatic production of legal decisions. 
For example, on the concept of persecution, the famous UNHCR (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees’ states that: 
There is no universally accepted definition of “persecution”, and various 
attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little success. From 
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, it may be inferred that a threat to life 
or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
membership of a particular social group is always persecution. Other 
serious violations of human rights – for the same reasons – would also 
constitute persecution.   
In the same way, when discussing the concept of “degrading treatment”, the 
European Court of Human Rights has come to the conclusion that: 
the assessment [of degrading treatment, JP] is, in the nature of 
things, relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case and, in 
particular, on the nature and context of the punishment itself and the 
manner and method of its execution.83
83 Tyrer case, ECHR (1978), Series A. No. 26, 15. 
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So, what constitutes “degrading treatment” (poverty, illness, environmental 
degradation, homelessness, war, etc) depends on the context (reasons, balancing, 
values, etc). And this is true even though the very idea of human rights is precisely 
to do away with that type of context-dependent policy discretion. In other words, 
when we are promoting human rights at an abstract level, we have not started 
to tackle the hard (policy) questions discussed above.  In my article “Shadows in 
Paradise”, for example, I put forward some factors that can make one interpretation 
of formal and open human rights concepts in professional practice feel more correct 
than another, and I explain why the content of certain interpretations remains fairly 
stable within institutions. 
The tension between theory and practice is, of course, visible also in the operation 
of human rights institutions and mechanisms. As I write in my “OPCAT article”, 
a National Preventive Mechanism under the OPCAT protocol should carry out 
“regular” visits to places of detention. But the protocol does not clarify what “regular” 
means in practice, or what should happen at the visit. This is left to the mechanism 
itself to decide. What reference to human rights mean in a particular context is often 
dependent on how the institution that has the task to apply them understands it. 
Possessing powers is one thing, making the most effective use of them is another. 
So we can see that abstract standards do not set clear guidelines for practice.
The above discussed indeterminacy of human rights is a problem only if it starts 
to produce bad or biased practical consequences, or if it is used, for example, to 
promote alien or otherwise unacceptable aims under the camouflage of a universal 
human rights commitment. Whether consequences are good or bad, depends – of 
course – on one’s perspective on the matter as well as on the priorities and values 
one wants to promote. This is discussed in “Shadows in Paradise” and “European 
Asylum Policy”.
But there is wider indeterminacy than such linguistic openness in refugee or 
human rights law articles. For example, Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights stipulates in a rather comprehensive manner that: “Everyone has the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance.” Despite the clarity of this formulation, however, on a 
practical level there is a wide variety of conceptions of what this freedom entails. Does 
it, for example, include the right to establish a religious party, or the right to wear 
a beard in prison? The interpretation of freedom of religion by the European Court 
of Human Rights, as I argue in my article “Freedom of Religion”, can turn out not 
to give universal protection for freedom of religion but rather to be a European and 
Christian way of thinking of the freedom of religion, a kind of Christian interpreted 
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universalism. Immanuel Wallerstein has written in his “European Universalism. 
The Rhetoric of Power” that:
The concepts of human rights and democracy, the superiority of 
Western civilisation because it is based on universal values and truths, 
and the inescapability of submission to the “market” are all offered to 
us as self evident ideas. But they are not at all self evident. They are 
complex ideas that need to be analysed carefully, and stripped of their 
noxious and nonessential parameters, in order to be evaluated soberly 
and put to the service of everyone rather than a few. Understanding 
how these ideas came to be asserted originally, by whom and for what 
ends, is a necessary part of this task of evaluation.84
In other words, freedom of religion in Europe – at least in the light of the examples 
in my article “Freedom of Religion” – is protected in the context of the policy 
requirements and sensibilities of European societies. This can be a bad practical 
consequence of an abstract human rights norm. Again, this type of assessment 
of different political, religious, moral and strategic interests and perspectives is 
something that human rights – freedom of religion in this case – is often said to 
prevent. What is the meaning of human rights, if they are a synonym for good 
policy? How can human rights be universal, inherent, absolute and beyond politics, 
if in practice they are simultaneously and constantly subject to different kinds of 
political and strategic balancing? And if human rights are just a synonym for good 
policy, what is the real and practical meaning of human rights “experts” and new 
human rights institutions? 
It is clear that problems related to indeterminacy of rights language are not 
limited to the themes of my articles. International human rights law is full of 
open concepts like “fair trial”, “family life”, “freedom of expression”, “effective 
remedy”, “discrimination”, “highest attainable standard of physical health”, “right 
to education”, and “right to adequate standard of living”, which remain open to 
different politically appropriate interpretations. The practical implementation of 
these concepts can have good or bad consequences as discussed above.   
Furthermore, human rights also often defer to policy requirements in other 
ways. This may happen for example when different human rights are found to 
be in conflict with each other. Conflicts may even occur between the same right 
claimed by different rights-holders. Again, conflicting rights claims cannot be solved 
by resorting to rights, but by looking to circumstances beyond rights, to culturally 
conditioned and politically agreed ways of deciding what is appropriate in a society 
84 Immanuel Wallerstein, European Universalism. The Rhetoric of Power (The New Press, 2006), p.xiii.
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or in a particular administration – what leads to good and workable results.  Often 
both sides in a social conflict refer to their human rights. For example, freedom of 
speech can be in conflict with the right to security. The Jyllands-Posten Muhammad 
cartoons controversy that took place in Denmark in 2005 was also about freedom of 
religion and freedom of speech, as I note in “Freedom of Religion”. The supporters 
of the cartoons felt that the cartoons were a legitimate exercise of the freedom of 
speech. The critics felt that the cartoons were blasphemous and insulting, infringing 
the freedom of religion. Can either freedom of religion or freedom of speech, as 
abstract rights or as decisions of international human rights monitoring bodies, 
provide us with neutral and objective grounds for solving such conflicts? Should 
freedom of speech always prevail in spite of the consequences? There is no single 
solution for rights conflicts, no single vision for the good life that rights would 
express.85 The solution for choosing between the rights can thus become only from 
outside rights themselves – typically from some institutionally entrenched bias or 
set of preferences. 
Furthermore, conflicts between different kinds of rights are likely to increase as 
rights are used more widely in the conduct of world affairs. Human rights lawyers 
and humanitarians increasingly invoke rights language when confronted with the 
fate of people abandoned by the state or excluded from the community. Rights claims 
can also be invoked to protect the business rights of companies, the rights of the 
foetus or human rights to euthanasia, for example. The right to sexual pleasure, the 
right to peace, the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment, 
and the right to preservation of the air, soil, water, flora, fauna and biodiversity are 
examples of new or evolving human rights.86 Referring to the powerful language 
of rights can be very attractive as a general belief, and effective also as political 
rhetoric.87 Indeed, rights language has a powerful emotional and political appeal, 
and arguments and demands expressed in rights language are often taken seriously.
Proliferation of “rights” creates new rights conflicts which cannot be solved by 
referring to rights, but only to the political, cultural and economic circumstances 
outside rights. And whether this is good or bad depends on how the balancing 
exercise between conflicting rights is carried out, and what kind of (political, 
economic, ethical, and global) priorities and concepts of good the exercise supports. 
In addition, as human rights practitioners know very well, human rights come 
with the possibility of restrictions, and the doctrine of margin of appreciation can 
85 See Martti Koskenniemi, “The Effect of Rights on Political Culture”, in Philip Alston with Mara Bustelo and 
James Heenan (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 105-116.
86 On the proliferation of rights language, see Miia Halme, Human Rights in Action (Helsinki University Print, 
2008).  
87 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009) p. 355. 
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compromise the abstract promise of protection. As to the margin of appreciation, 
I wrote in my article “Freedom of Religion” that: 
The justification of the so-called “margin of appreciation” also lies in the 
wish of the Court to recognize that the cultural, historic and philosophical 
differences between states party to the European Convention on Human 
Rights may justify different interpretations of the Convention. This 
doctrine makes it easier for the Court to take into account policy and 
other arguments of governments regarding what is “necessary” when 
freedom of religion is interpreted in practice.88  It is a doctrine designed 
to balance state sovereignty with the need to ensure observance of the 
Convention and thereby avoid confrontations between the ECHR and 
states parties. In this way human rights (or freedom of religion) become 
conditioned by policy choices of European state institutions which are 
justifiable by reference to alternative conceptions of a just society. Thus, 
it is not insignificant who decides what the freedom of religion entails 
and when restrictions are needed. 
In professional practice abstract rights are also subject to restrictions. The 
difficulty is that the scope or conditions for the application of the exception are 
not clearly defined. According to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall “be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, 
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. When we look at the above 
grounds for restrictions to freedom of religion and find phrases like “necessary in 
democratic society”, “public safety” or “health and morals”, we can see that there 
is no automatic, context-independent or non-political rule or standard criterion 
that would provide the answer for when to apply the rule and when exceptions are 
needed. In practice this depends on particular circumstances of the case. Often this 
is left to the state to decide. 
From indeterminacy and rights conflicts it follows that the content of human 
rights depends very much on the institution that has power to define their meaning 
and correct interpretation. Different institutions and bodies (courts, human rights 
NGOs, governmental authorities, European Union, international human rights 
committees, etc.) can have very different kind of views as to the appropriate 
interpretation of open human rights standards.  In practice, institutions prefer 
88 See, for example, Lautsi v. Italy – Request for third party intervention (Article 44.2 of the Rules of Court) 
by the European Humanist Federation (23 May 2010) at www.humanistfederation.eu. 
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some values or choices over some other preferences. Thus, human rights language 
always ends up promoting some particular policies over some other policies. In other 
words, as human rights do not “naturally” lead us towards justice or political good, 
it is not irrelevant what institutions are entitled to assign human rights (freedom 
of religion or inhuman treatment, for example) with content and how this type of 
institutional power is monitored. 
The above section raises at least the following questions: What does it mean 
in practice to “promote human rights”? What does it mean to strive for “human 
rights friendly” decisions to the conflicting demands of a plural society? In my 
articles “Shadows in Paradise”, “European Asylum Policy”, “OPCAT article” and 
“Freedom of Religion”, I have explored some factors and perspectives which offer 
some responses to such questions.  
5.4 HuMAn rIgHTS AS POwer, gOvernAnCe  
 And dISTOrTIOn
The general acceptance of human rights relate to their great level of abstraction. 
However, an agreement on human rights in abstract level does not provide us with 
guidance as to what is needed for their implementation in practice. In the previous 
section, I already discussed some problems – indeterminacy and rights conflicts, 
for example – that can complicate the translation of abstract rights – freedom of 
religion, inhuman treatment, for example – into practical measures.    
The powerful language of rights can also be used, of course, in many other 
“external” contexts and arenas that I have not touched upon (at least directly) in 
my articles. For example, rights language can be employed for military campaigns, 
development projects, projects that have to do with environment and climate change, 
trade, good governance, poverty reduction, empowerment of women, and so on. 
Whether the use of human rights language in these and other context is a useful 
strategic tool, remains to be studied in each case separately. Also, in these contexts 
rights can have good and bad consequences depending of the perspective to the 
matter. 
Human rights language can be a useful strategic tool in above mentioned contexts 
as it does do not only restrict, but also create opportunities. Human right can be 
used for resistance but it can also be used for hegemony. It can help to challenge 
prevailing power relations but in can also help efforts to keep things as they are.89 
The lack of agreement on the content and use of human rights, gives the people and 
89 See Susan Marks , “Human rights in disastrous times”  in  Cambridge Companion to International Law (eds. 
James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi) (Cambridge University Press, 2012) p. 321.
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institutions implementing them the role of deciding how they are used and what 
is their substance in particular context.  Indeed, when examining human rights in 
practice (instead of as abstract norms and goals), one can easily see that human 
rights are not only trying to set limits to the use of power, but are often also part 
of power and governance. Human rights are not only about setting limits, but are 
also linked to the question of the legitimacy of the power to rule.  
Upendra Baxi has argued that:
The sovereign power constantly negotiates the imperatives of the 
rule of law in ways that, for example, somehow render legitimate the 
affluence of the few with the extreme impoverishment of many; locally 
and globally. The form of reproduction of rights and legality often, at 
least from the standpoint of those violated, combines, and recombines, 
the rule of law with the reign of terror.90
Human rights language can, for example, create opportunities by hiding other 
interest of the powerful. At the present time, in the wake of September 11 and the 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, human rights and humanitarian 
rhetoric are sometimes seen as means to hide imperial self-interest which is likely to 
make human suffering worse. Contemporary humanitarianism is no longer always 
the cry of dissidents, campaigners and protesters, but a common vocabulary that 
brings together the government, the army, radicals and human rights activists. 
Human rights people who sometimes felt marginal to power, have been admitted to 
the corridors and back rooms of power and this unnatural coupling paves the way 
for the future. This development may be shocking news to the Amnesty International 
members stuffing envelopes to support political prisoners. Before the Afghanistan 
war Colin Powell stated that:
NGOs are such a force multiplier to us, such an important part of our 
combat team… [we are] committed to the same singular purpose to 
help the humankind. We share the same values and objectives so let us 
combine forcers on the side of civilisation.91
90 Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 8. On the other hand, as 
Baxi also notes, the normative quest for governance structures that produce legitimate laws with a more 
serious regard for human rights emphasizes the democratic participatory rights of the people (by free and 
fair elections) to challenge the government’s visions of human rights.
91 Quoted in Costas Douzinas, “The Many Faces of Humanitarianism”, at www.mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2009, 
accessed 23.11.2010
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Indeed, contrary to common expectations, modern war can engage also human 
rights institutions that we usually associate for peace and protection of human beings. 
Whether these types of alliances are good or bad is difficult to say in an abstract level. 
As David Kennedy has noted, international law – including human rights law – is 
part of the war even though it is often thought to be against war and setting limits 
to military conflicts. Strange as it sounds, human rights language can be used to 
legitimate pain and suffering as humanitarian vocabulary can open opportunities for 
killing and humiliating people. Military actions are often legitimated by underlining 
the legality of bombings. Thus, universal, inalienable and equal human rights are 
not necessarily violated when somebody is killed according to the rules of warfare, 
including human rights law. Humanitarian vocabulary of human rights law is often 
mobilised as a strategic asset in modern conflict.92 
To give another example,  Tiina Pajuste has examined how human rights language 
have been  used in the context of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
and who benefits from this policy.93 She has noted that due to the indeterminate 
and complex nature of human rights, the specific content of human rights is often 
determined by the entity interpreting it. In practice, the right to interpret means 
power to decide and to choose between several in themselves possible alternatives. 
This often involves prioritising some actors’ preferences over the claims or priorities 
of some other actors. In ESDP operation this might mean, for example, on deciding 
the concrete meaning of certain human rights in practice: for example where the 
limits of the freedom of expression of some group should lie, or how to balance the 
right of movement of a person as against the right of security of another person 
of group.  In operational level, what rights in practice should be given priority and 
what rights should be dealt with later. The various institutions of EU can have 
different understandings on how particular rights should be understood or put to 
effect.  Whether this is good or bad can only be evaluated in context.94 
Human rights are also part of a governance language – both nationally and 
internationally. Often rights language is thought to be rather unproblematic aspect 
of good governance. In national level, for example in Finland, this is probably the 
case.   But if we examine the use of rights language as part of good governance in 
92 For detailed analysis on law and war see, David Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and warfare’ in Cambridge Companion 
to International Law (eds. James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi) (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
pp. 158-183.
93 Tiina Pajuste, Mainstreaming Human Rights in the Context of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(The Erik Castrén Institute Research Reports, 2008) p. 93-94.
94 And it is always debatable what exactly ”respect” or “promotion” of human rights entail. Does it mean that 
no violation of that right should occur? Surely not. Such a situation is not even achievable in the EU member 
states themselves. Furthermore, what does it mean to say that there should be general ‘respect for human 
rights’? For example, the CONOPS (Concept of Operations)  for EUPOL Afghanistan states as one of the 
objectives ‘ institutional respect for and adherence to international Human Rights Law. Tiina Pajuste, Ibid, 
p. 96.
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international arena we can see that rights language is often accompanied by other 
policy suggestions and arguments. The UNDP, the World Bank and the Council 
of Europe, for example, can promote different and competing aspects of good 
governance. In his study on governance and international law, Samuli Seppänen 
has observed that “The European Committee of Social Rights advances a state-
cantered policy approach to governance, whereas the World Bank fosters economic 
liberalism”95 In other words, good governance as a human right can also hide the 
policies that are conducted under it. Whether this is good or bad depends on the 
context and the goals that are promoted. 
Yet another example of the many uses of human rights language in different 
arenas could be development co-operation. It is clear that the language of human 
rights can help raise funds, organise campaigns and provide means for setting 
checks and balances for recipients of development aid. The focus of human rights 
on individual actors can also increase the sensitivity of development programs to 
the difficulties and – what Martha Nusbaum would call – capabilities of so called 
vulnerable groups.96  But again little is achieved by simply restating that human 
rights are essential for development. To make abstract human rights relevant for 
the practical development, they need to be connected to reality and in this process 
they go beyond legal norms. It is a human right argument to say that everybody has 
right to food but from this rule we cannot conclude whether to start financing small 
scale micro credits project in Africa. If this logic is followed to the end, it appears 
that human rights based approach is not, after all, the decisive development policy. 97
Probably most comprehensive general list of possible costs, distortions and 
preferences of human rights language is provided by David Kennedy.98 While 
acknowledging the achievements of human rights, Kennedy argues that they can also 
be “part of the problem”. The purpose of Kennedy’s list of concerns is to encourage 
95 Samuli Seppänen, Good Governance in International law (Erik Castrén Institute Research Reports 2003). 
p.  114.
96 Martha Nusbaum, Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2011). This approach holds that the key question to ask, when comparing societies and 
assessing them for their basic decency or justice is: “What is each person able to do and to be?” (p. 18). She 
writes that the capabilities approach is closely allied with the international human rights movement. The 
common ground, according to Nusbaum, lies in the idea that “all people have some core entitlements just 
by virtue of their humanity, and that it is basic duty of society to respect and support these entitlements 
(p. 62).  
97 Samuli Seppänen, Possibilities and Challenges of the Human Rights-Based Approach to Development (Erik 
Castrén Institute Research Reports 2005), p. 55.
98 See David Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?”, European Human 
Rights Law Review, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 245-266. Kennedy’s work has been criticised as being ineffective, 
abstract, and personal, and an academic quest or confession. It has been suggested that his arguments should 
for this reason be taken as isolated and highly personal, and not as something that need concern the real life 
of the human rights movement. See Jan Klabbers, Sceptical Views on Human Rights (Book review), Nordisk 
Tidsskrift for Mennesseskerettigheter (Nordic Journal of Human Rights) Vol 21 (2003), pp. 206-210, at p. 
207.
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“well-meaning legal professionals” to adopt a more pragmatic attitude towards 
human rights. He aims at developing a stronger practice of weighing and calculating 
the costs and benefits of human rights, instead of treating human rights as an object 
of devotion. In the context of this introduction, it is necessary to mention only a 
few of the possible “cost” of human rights that relate to the topic of this section.  
First of all, Kennedy is worried that human rights language occupies the field of 
emancipatory possibilities. As a dominant and fashionable vocabulary for thinking 
about emancipation, human rights can, Kennedy argues, crowd out other ways of 
understanding harm and recompense. This is easiest to see when human rights 
attracts institutional energy and resources and excludes initiatives that are not 
expressed as human rights projects. A “universal” idea, like human rights, of what 
counts as a problem, can be harmful to local political and social initiatives. 
He also argues that human rights often view the problem and the solution too 
narrowly. Rights language mainly criticises the state and seeks public law remedies, 
but it leaves unattended the powers of private actors. Interestingly, problems and 
solutions are also defined in a way that is not likely to change the economy. 
But human rights can also over-generalise. Human rights propagates an abstract 
idea about people, politics and society. One-size-fits-all emancipatory practice often 
fails to recognise, and reduces the quantity of and possibility for, particularity and 
variations. To come into an understanding of oneself as a person who has human 
rights can be a problem. In Kennedy’s view this can mean a loss of awareness of 
the unprecedented and plastic nature of experience, a loss of a capacity “to imagine 
and desire alternative futures”.99
Human rights also particularises too much. The focus on right-holding identities 
and individuals blunts an awareness of diversity, of the continuity of human 
experience, and of overlapping identities. By consolidating human experience into 
the exercise of legal entitlements, human rights strengthen the national governmental 
structure, and equate the structure of the state with the structure of the freedom. 
Encouraging people to see themselves as right holders can discourage negotiation 
and politics. The difficult effort to codify a “right to asylum”, for example, illustrates 
the difficulty of addressing solutions as matters of legal entitlement. According to 
Kennedy, we should question whether the effort to define the identity and rights 
of the refugee is more part of the problem than of the solution. 
For Kennedy, human rights express the ideology, ethics, aesthetic sensibility 
and political practice of a particular Western eighteenth to twentieth century 
liberalism. The human rights movement is a product of particular moment and 
place: post-enlightenment, rationalist, secular, Western, modern, and capitalist. But 
99 David Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?”, European Human 
Rights Law Review, Issue 3, 2001, p. 254.
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from the pragmatic point of view, origins are irrelevant. The fact that the human 
rights movement is really the product of a specific cultural or historical origin, 
says nothing unless that origin renders human rights less useful in practice. The 
Western origin of human rights can become a problem when general difficulties of 
the liberal tradition are carried over to the human rights movement. The human 
rights movement contributes to the framing of political choices in the third world 
between local/traditional and international/modern forms of government. Human 
rights are similar to universal, rational and civilised. 
One problem with rights, in Kennedy’s view, is that they promise more than 
they can deliver. Human rights promise a way of knowing the difference between 
just and unjust, universal and local, victim and violator. But in practice, justice 
is something which must be made, experienced, articulated, and performed each 
time anew. Justice is seen as an instrument of law rather than as a political actor, 
but this is simply not possible given the porous legal vocabulary with which judges 
must work, and the likely political context within which judges are asked to act.
The legal regime of “human rights”, taken as a whole, can also do more to 
produce and excuse violations than to prevent and remedy them. Human rights 
remedies treat the symptoms rather than the illness. The vague and conflicting 
norms of human rights, their uncertain status and broad justification, the possibility 
of exceptions to them, their lack of enforcement and the attention paid to them as 
a problem that is peripheral to a broadly conceived programme of social justice, 
may in some contexts place the human rights movement in the uncomfortable 
position of legitimating more injustice than it eliminates. This is particularly true 
when human rights discourse is absorbed into foreign policy processes. 
Sometimes the human rights movement can strengthen bad international 
governance.  Human rights share with the rest of international law a tendency to 
treat only the tips of icebergs. Deference to the legal forms upon which human rights 
is built – the forms of sovereignty, territorial jurisdictional divisions, and subsidiarity 
– makes it seem natural to isolate aspects of a problem for special handling at 
the international level, often entrenching the rest of the iceberg more firmly in 
the national political background.  The human rights vocabulary emphasises the 
development of law and strengthens the tendency of international lawyers to focus 
on legal regimes, rather than on questions of distribution in broader society. 
Indeed, human rights promotion can be bad politics in particular contexts. The 
transformation of political questions into legal questions, and then into questions 
of legal “rights”, can make other forms of collective emancipatory politics less 
readily available. But this, of course, is not always the case. The point of an ongoing 
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pragmatic evaluation of the human rights effort is precisely to develop a habit of 
making of such an assessment.100 
In the light of the above concerns by Kennedy and others, the human rights 
community should indeed be sensitive to the expanding human rights bureaucracy 
and the possible costs and benefits related to this process. This in underlined by 
the fact that the human rights bureaucracy as a whole has faced a dramatic and 
substantial expansion. Miia Halme has noted that six decades after the adoption 
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights “a community of endless NGOs, 
experts, policy makers, volunteers, educators, politicians and ordinary citizens has 
emerged around the human rights discourse”.101  The expansion of human rights is 
also reflected in the increasing number of human rights conventions, human rights 
institutions, human rights experts, human rights monitoring bodies, human rights 
policies and programmes, etc. 102 Human rights are used more widely in the conduct 
of world affairs than ever before.    
But it is not clear if expanding the human rights language is always the best 
way to tackle emerging problems at a national or global level. For example, if new 
human rights conventions in practice defer to the policy requirements of states (as 
discussed in section 5), a proliferation of human rights can also diminish the general 
value of so-called fundamental human rights for the general population. Every effort 
to use human rights for new purposes or to cover new problems requires people to 
make arguments they know to be less persuasive. 
The human rights movement attracts and mobilises thousands of good-
hearted people around the globe every year. But the human rights vocabulary and 
commitment to human rights should not become blind to the real and practical 
results of this commitment as discussed above. Human rights are part of the 
100 For detailed analyses of Kennedy’s concerns, see his article “The International Human Rights Movement: Part 
of the Problem?” cited above, as only some of his ideas are used above. Compare David Kennedy to David 
Held who, from another perspective, has cast a shadow over the appeal of human rights by arguing that, 
instead of human rights, the world needs a new universal language and principles, a “layered cosmopolitan 
perspective” to form a basis for a new “cosmopolitan orientation”. He feels that new cosmopolitan values can 
be expressed in terms of universal principles and standards that can protect and guide our realm of humanity. 
For him these principles are: (1) equal worth and dignity, (2) active agency, (3) personal responsibility and 
accountability, (4) consent, (5) collective decision making about public matters through voting procedures, 
(6) inclusiveness and subsidiary, (7) avoidance of serious harm, and (8) sustainability. It is not clear what 
additional value Held provides to other current lists of rights. One practical problem regarding human 
rights can  be the fact that things that are worthy of praise in human beings do not always find relevant 
space in rights language, which is an idea I adopt in “Shadows in Paradise” and “Freedom of Religion”.  See 
David Held, “Principles of Cosmopolitan Order”, in Law and Justice in Global Society, a publication of the 
IVR Congress (2005), International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. University of 
Granada, (2005), pp. 146-147.
101 Miia Halme, Human Rights in Action (Helsinki University Print, 2008), p. 7-8. 
102 Mary Ann Glendon has stated that a rapidly expanding catalogue of rights – extending to trees, animals, 
smokers, nonsmokers, consumers, and so on – not only multiplies the occasions for collisions but risks 
trivializing core democratic values. A tendency to frame nearly every social controversy in terms of a clash 
of rights impedes compromise, mutual understanding, and the discovery of common ground. See Mary Ann 
Glendon, Rights Talk. The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (The Free Press, 1991), pp. xi and 14.
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institutional power. As I tried to show in this section, institutions can often decide 
how open ended human rights language is used in concrete situations and where 
human rights language is taking us. But we do not necessarily always agree on 
how institutions are using their powers. This is another reason why it is necessary 
to approach human rights from a pragmatic perspective, and it will be discussed 
in section 6. 
Human rights as:
• open and conﬂicting concepts
• governance, bureaucracy and power
• policy
• hypocricy and cliché
Human rights as:
• universal, inalienable and equal rights
• democratic governance
• rules, principles and standards
• language of injustice and pain
• inspiration and commitmentT
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figure 2  Human rights is not only a theory, it is also a practice as discussed in section 5 
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6 towarDs a PragmatiC evaLuation  
 of rights
In previous sections I have discussed human rights from a theoretical as well as 
from a practical perspective. When human rights operate in professional contexts, 
these two perspectives merge into each other. The fusion of rights with practice is 
part of the dynamism and appeal of human rights. 
The theoretical and practical perspectives on human rights are also present 
in my articles. In ”Prohibition of Return”, “OPCAT article”  and “Culture and 
Human Rights”,  I discuss human rights from a somewhat theoretical perspective 
as standards, rules, institutions and language that can provide protection against 
cruelty and oppression. In “Shadows in Paradise”, “Freedom of religion”, and 
“European Asylum Policy”, I am more interested in how abstract norms are turned 
into practical measures. The overall aim of my article writing has been to show that 
when human rights are put into practice, they can be both “triumph and disaster”, 
simultaneously something significant and something problematic.103  
As discussed in section 5 above, a gap can be seen to exist between an abstract 
human rights norm and its realisation, a thin line between promise and practice (or 
between rhetoric and reality).  I have so far only tried to argue that implementing 
human rights in practice is not a technical or logical operation but often a question 
about priorities, choices and political battles. Both at the international and national 
level, human rights related resources are often limited. For this reason, it is necessary 
to choose and prioritize between different kinds of human rights concerns. Human 
rights conventions as such do not help us to decide whether we should fight poverty 
abroad, or put our human rights resources in improving the human rights of 
prisoners at home. By reading human rights articles, we cannot decide whether it 
is more important to focus resources on preventing HIV/AIDS in Africa or improving 
the human rights of the old people in homes for the elderly, or minorities at home. 
In other words, when an abstract norm is put into practice, a choice and a decision 
regarding the priorities and interpretation of “universal” human rights is needed. 
Often this interpretation of human rights is made by the authorities, the UN, 
the relevant national or international court, human rights monitoring bodies or 
committees, human rights NGOs,  human rights experts or believers, for example. 
103 Costas Douzinas ”Six Theses on the End(s) of Human Rights”, in Finnish Yearbook of International Law 
(Kluwer Law International, 2002)  p. 201
56
This decision or practice by one of the above human rights bodies is sometimes 
portrayed as non-political, neutral or progressive. If human rights decisions were to 
be portrayed as particular, subjective or political, the role of human rights “standards” 
would become unclear, as it is precisely human rights law that is often thought to set 
limits to the political and particular manoeuvring of states and other relevant bodies. 
But, as discussed above, implementing human rights is never non-political: it is 
about taking sides, setting priorities, negotiating compromises, allocating resources 
and balancing different interests and values. There is nothing necessarily wrong 
or bad in this, as the balancing and prioritising can lead to good results. However, 
understanding the political and partial operation of human rights invites us to 
evaluate human rights from a pragmatic perspective. When human rights are at 
the service of practice they can have both dark and bright sides, if they are to have 
any meaning at all.   
It is interesting to explore the practical operation of human rights and human 
rights institutions, as no particular use or meaning given to human rights can be 
the final word on the meaning of the concept. Instead of treating human rights as 
self-evidently something “good” or significant or progressive, we have to look at 
the different and changing aspects and understandings of their practical operation. 
Instead of debating whether human rights are universal or inalienable, it is necessary 
to be sensitive to the good and bad consequences of these rights. In the same way, 
a pragmatic approach to human rights is not interested in whether human rights 
are theoretically a Western concept or a bourgeois luxury, as proposed by Marx, 
but in whether these rights can sometimes, in a particular discussion or context, 
be used to reconcile conflicting parties and enable them to listen to each other’s 
interpretation of universal claims; I try to elaborate on this in my article “Culture 
and Human Rights”. 
The practical meaning of rights can be evaluated by adopting a more pragmatic 
attitude towards human rights, and developing a stronger practice of weighing the 
costs and benefits or dark and bright sides of the articulation, institutionalisation 
and enforcement of human rights.104  I would agree with Martti Koskenniemi, who 
noted that the virtues and vices of international law cannot be discussed in the 
abstract. 105  He has written that the effects one’s formalism or anti-formalism have 
on one’s legal practice, or the effects legal institutions have on society, can only 
be “contextually determined”. We need a great deal of supplemental work and 
detailed reasoning to know where rights are taking us, and if they are taking us in 
a direction we want to support. For this reason it is not always wise on a general 
104 David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement : Part of the Problem?”, European Human 
Rights Law Review, Issue 3, 2001, p. 246
105 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 616. 
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level to “promote human rights”; when we promote indeterminate and conflicting 
rights, do we always know whose rights and priorities we are promoting?
The pragmatic evaluation of human rights, means specifying the concrete and 
practical benefits and harms which might attend human rights decisions or initiatives 
in particular cases and contexts. Only by looking at human rights in practice, can 
we acquire more information about the world around us and evaluate whether 
abstract rights can live up to their promises. At its best, the pragmatic evaluation 
of rights can make visible the dynamism and operation, but also the vulnerability, 
of human rights arguments, and the effectiveness of human rights bureaucracy in 
professional practice. A pragmatic perspective might show, for example, whose 
policy priorities human rights support, and who are included and who are excluded 
when human rights norms are interpreted and decisions on allocations of resources 
are made. Pragmatic perspective to rights can assist in looking the implementation 
of human rights as a kind of policy.  It might also show how human rights are part 
of governance and bureaucracy, and how they really make a difference to those who 
suffer or are humiliated (disabled people, old people in institutions, Roma people, 
etc). It has also been suggested that a pragmatic approach to rights is helpful in 
showing the boundaries to what state and non-state actors can and cannot do in 
practice in the field of human rights.106  
This type of pragmatic approach to human rights looks at human rights as a 
form of power. The abstract story of rights is questioned, and its practical operation 
is analysed, by examining the connections between the regimes of power served 
by human rights, and the construction of the practices and diversities it enforces. 
This type of analysis, which is of course nothing new, can sometimes, I hope, bring 
about progressive political change and at least keep alive the arguments about the 
interpretation and different strategic uses of human rights. 
In contrast to H. L. A. Hart’s well-known external/internal perspectives to rights, 
a pragmatic approach seeks to link the facticity of human rights discourse to its 
practical use.107
Florian Hoffmann deserves to be quoted at length: 
The pragmatic perspective aims to comprehend human rights discourse 
not in terms what it could be but what it arguably is, namely a plural, 
polycentric and ultimately indeterminate discourse amenable to use by 
everyone (nearly) everywhere. Whether individuals and groups wish 
to challenge what they perceive as oppressive or hegemonic structures, 
106 Todd Landman, “Politics, Pragmatism, and Human Rights”, Human Rights & Human Welfare, Vol 3.1, 2003, 
p. 31.
107 Florian F. Hoffmann, “Human Rights, the Self and the Other: Reflections on a Pragmatic Theory of Human 
Rights”, in Anne Orford (ed.), International Law and its Others (Cambridge University Press, 2006) p. 225.
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they can avail themselves of that discourse, as they might use a hammer 
to send shockwaves through a concrete wall. The logic of plurality 
implies, however, that the effect of these discursive irritations is beyond 
control of those creating them, and is ultimately uncertain. There is no 
single “correct” signification, and, therefore, use of human rights, but 
only context-specific uses. This, in turn means that a pragmatically 
inspired acceptance of epistemological scepticism need not lead to the 
summary dismissal of human rights and the abrupt discontinuance of 
their active promotion. Instead, it may be just a precondition for the 
new discursive form, one that accepts at once the multiple validities of 
human rights, and the singular validity of their promotion. 108 
In other words, despite the haziness and fluidity of the concept of human rights, 
they are nonetheless being used almost everywhere and by everyone, whether in 
good faith or in bad faith, and with whatever connotations they are given. From this 
perspective, a human rights system should not only be viewed as something good 
and unproblematic (as in the kind of cliché described by Hoffmann), but also as 
a living normative system that in practice can be used for “good” or ”bad” causes.
So, the practical meaning of human rights can only be understood in a concrete 
context, and through the subjective sense made of it by actors in that context. No 
set of discourse rules can pre-determine the outcome of the use of human rights. In 
other words, human rights discourse cannot control the way human rights is used 
by human rights actors. Human rights cannot be disassociated from the subjective 
meanings actors bestow on them in concrete situations. This means, for example, 
that there are no objective or non-political ways to determine the “correct” use 
of human rights; I try to elaborate on this in my articles “Shadows in Paradise”, 
“European Asylum Policy” and “Freedom of Religion”.109 
Furthermore, a pragmatic approach to human rights looks at the unresolved 
tension between the juridical world of rights and the political world of their 
realisation. It considers the sometimes dramatic encounters between abstract 
108 Ibid, pp. 225-226.
109 It is clear that objections can easily be raised to this emptying of human rights of its objective and normative 
substance. One concern relates to the practice of international and national human rights courts and bodies. 
These forums, it could be argued, constitute particular interpretative communities which are presumed to 
understand each other. They could be claimed to have a reasonably clear understanding of the meaning 
of human rights – the meaning of degrading treatment, for example. But, as I try show throughout this 
introduction, this is not the case. Human rights are open and political concepts, and there is always a lot of 
room for the construction of their meaning, for their indeterminacy and for their evolution. Human rights law 
is full of indeterminacies, making the implementation of human rights an open process. Human rights are 
never safe from subsequent modification. This is true for human rights language, standards and institutions 
as well as for human rights decisions. Human rights are only instantiated momentarily “when particular 
meanings emerge through the interaction of discourse and consciousness.” On this, see also Hoffmann (ibid.) 
at p. 230-233.
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rights language and legal, political and religious power; this is discussed by me in 
“Freedom of Religion”, for example.  Establishing a new human rights institution 
or monitoring body, for example, can be an excellent idea in theory, but only in 
its practice is it possible to analyse the costs and benefits, or the dark and bright 
sides, of that institution. International refugee law is beneficial for those who need 
international protection against persecution, but it also creates artificial definitions, 
giving opportunities and mechanisms for governments to send asylum seekers back 
to their home countries without violating their human rights. 
What a pragmatic approach can do, is to focus on the making of (political) choices, 
and on the power that is always present in the operation of human rights. Pragmatic 
calculations can help us to understand why certain interpretations of human rights 
law are produced and privileged over other interpretations. I discuss this in “Shadows 
in Paradise” and “Freedom of Religion”, for example. Demonstrating this type of 
contingency in the operation of open human rights concepts can assist us seeing 
that it is not possible to arrive at a consensus without exclusion. 
From a pragmatic perspective, it becomes more difficult to “promote human 
rights” or “do human rights” without the risk of promoting “wrong” preferences. 
Florian Hoffmann summarises the current situation as regards the operation of 
human rights as follows.  For as long as the “criticism of human rights seemed to 
be safely confined to a few neo-Marxists, cultural anthropologists and friends of 
the Chinese government, human rights activists could ignore critical voices”. He 
continues that it seemed possible to spend one’s entire working life “doing human 
rights” without ever stepping back to reflect on why one was actually doing them, 
on what grounds and with what final vision of the world and the human beings in 
it. It seemed self-evident that human rights were both real and good, and that their 
absence essentially denoted intolerable human suffering. 
This kind of unreflective view represents the clichéd version of human rights. 
The clichéd account of human rights is but a thin veneer that conceals the concept’s 
deeper foundation – or lack thereof. What are human rights, after all? What is the 
relationship between theory and practice? Are human rights moral, or legal, or 
something else, in character? Are they local or global discourse, ideas, legal/moral 
prescripts, cultural practices, or, indeed, inverted empirical descriptions of their 
lack, namely human rights violations? And what assumptions underlie the claim 
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that the concept of human rights can be known in socio-cultural contexts different 
from that in which it emerged? 110
A pragmatic approach to human rights also has its weaknesses. The critique 
of pragmatism is not that human rights practice would not implement human 
rights law “correctly” or neutrally, or that practitioners would fail to live up to 
the expectations emerging from international law or from the “field”. A pragmatic 
evaluation is vulnerable to criticism because it offers no clear objective vocabulary 
that would distance the practitioner from his or her daily work, in order to carry out 
a critical evaluation which would include referring to alternative practices.111 One 
way out of this dilemma is to see the dynamics of the interaction between abstract 
rights and their practical realisation. We can agree that human rights should be 
respected, but often disagree what this means in practice. Human rights are popular 
tools precisely because they make it possible to incorporate abstract demand with 
particular situation; every particular claim can be presented as human rights claim. 
But if abstract human rights claims start to support wrong priorities, we have to 
return to rights claims again. Because of this tension between rights and their 
realisation, practical interpretation and uses of rights must be carefully monitored 
by democratic institutions and civil society. We have to ask if rights are taking us 
to the direction we want to support, what kind of priorities and preferences rights 
language supports, and what kind of priorities are excluded. And in this (political) 
process, it is often necessary to return to the idea of universal human rights according 
to which every person everywhere in the world, irrespective of citizenship, residence, 
race, culture, class, caste or community, is entitled to enjoy some universal and 
inalienable human rights standards which others should respect.  
As I argue in the concluding remarks of my article “Freedom of Religion”, it is 
necessary “not to silence pragmatic analysis of human rights as the main task of the 
critical approach to the practice of human rights is to try to keep visible the circular 
relationship between rights and politics that are always involved in the application 
of human rights norms”. Focusing on the intersection between the human rights 
commitments of the state and the claimed rights of the individual, pragmatism can 
110 Hoffmann, Ibid., pp. 221, 224 and 227. On page 226, Hoffmann claims that human rights standards are often 
considered universal in the sense that “everyone has, or should have them;  that they are indivisible in the 
sense that that the international bill of rights essentially forms a coherent package of claims to a certain type 
of personhood and community – subsumed precisely under the label of human rights; that, on account of the 
latter, empirical conditions of human beings can – and indeed should – be measured against the “standards” 
set by these human rights norms; and finally, that the foundations of these human rights norms lie in some 
mixture of common (rational) morality and cross-cultural equivalence.”
111 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p.601. On the other hand, if we acknowledge that human rights decisions are always 
subjective, hegemonic and temporary it is also possible revise them – to keep the argument open.  Harm 
is done when the complexity of the Other is simplified and when essentialism and cultural categories are 
introduced – I discuss this in my “Freedom of Religion”.
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try to demonstrate who are included in, and who are excluded from, the protection 
of human rights, and what kind of factors are involved in this process.  
This is precisely what my thesis aims to do. Using different approaches, contexts 
and strategies, the seven articles and this introduction focus on revealing different 
theoretical and practical aspects of human rights, including the “political” or the 
contesting nature of human rights, as Chantal Mouffe has put it.  
Chantal Mouffe has described, in an interesting manner, modern democratic 
society as a society in which power, law and knowledge experience a “radical 
indeterminacy”. According to her, this is the consequence of the democratic 
revolution, which led to the disappearance of power that was previously embodied in 
the person of the prince and tied to a transcendental authority. In modern democratic 
societies, a new kind of social institution has been inaugurated in which power 
has become “an empty space”. In this empty space, human rights can play a role 
by challenging inclusions and exclusions and thus keeping democratic discussion 
alive.112
What is specific and valuable about modern liberal democracy is that, 
when properly understood, it creates a space in which this confrontation 
is kept open, power relations are always being put into question and 
victory can be final. However, such an ‘agonistic’ democracy requires 
accepting that conflict and division are inherent to politics and that 
there is no place where reconciliation could be definitively achieved as 
the full actualization of the unity of the “people”.113
112 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (Verso, 2009), pp. 1, 10. 
113 Ibid., p. 16.
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7 struCture of my thesis
The aim of the above sections concerning different understandings of human rights 
was to set a general theoretical frame of reference for my seven articles (or, in a way, 
seven case studies), and thus to complement them theoretically. As already noted, 
some of my articles discuss human rights in rather formal and abstract ways, and 
some articles raise more practical and also critical perspectives on the operation 
of rights. After this general discussion we need to focus on the seven articles that 
form the substance of my thesis.  
Articles 1 and 2 discuss the potentials and limitations of human rights 
language in a multicultural society, (“Culture and Human Rights” (1) and 
“Ihmisoikeudet ja eksoottinen Toinen” (2) or, in English, “Universal human 
rights and the Exotic Other”).
Article 3 compares the strengths and weaknesses of human rights standards 
in selected human rights conventions, and is entitled “Palauttamiskielto. 
Non-refoulement periaatteesta kolmessa ihmisoikeussopimuksessa” or, in 
English, “Prohibition of Return. Non-refoulement in three human rights 
conventions”.
Article 4 (“Shadows in Paradise”) discusses the potential, the limitations 
and the paradoxes of one human rights principle in the field of refugee law.
Article 5 (“European Asylum Policy”) analyses the use of human rights 
language by the EU in an important commitment under which decisions 
to include or exclude people, and appropriate policy arrangements, are 
carried out. 
Article 6 (“Freedom of Religion”) discusses the abstract commitment and 
practical application of freedom of religion as a human right. 
Article 7 (“OPCAT”) looks at the strengths and weaknesses of one human 
rights institution in the light of a new human rights protocol.  
The articles can be divided into two different groups, even though they have many 
common themes. The first two papers, “Culture and Human Rights” and “Human 
Rights and the Exotic Other”, analyse, on a rather theoretical level, the operation 
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of human rights in a multicultural world. Drawing on legal and anthropological 
discussion, Article 1 focuses on the meaning of “culture” and the claimed “Western 
origin” of the human rights concept, which is sometimes said to limit the usefulness 
of the concept of human rights in non-Western cultures. Article 2 is a continuation 
of the themes of Article 1, and analyses the paradoxes and tensions that emerge 
when human rights, which are claimed to be “Western” and universal, encounter 
a representative of a particular culture, the so-called “exotic Other”. 
The second group of articles (Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) discuss the operation 
of human rights in different practical contexts. Articles 3, 4 and 5 look at the dark 
and bright sides of human rights law in providing protection against persecution 
and inhuman treatment. Article 6 analyses the practical operation of freedom 
of religion in a multicultural society. Article 7 also deals with protection against 
prohibited treatment, but takes a more formal and institutional approach to human 
rights commitments, and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of one human 
rights institution, the Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland, in the light of a new 
human rights instrument, the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(OPCAT).
My study has two levels. On one level each individual article addresses particular 
research questions and provides conclusions on them (the “article level”). In this 
introduction (“introduction/synthesis level”), I examine and discuss my articles from 
the theory-practice perspective I have tried to set out in previous sections. I also 
try to provide answers to the tension (or what I call problem with rights) between 
abstract human rights and their practical realisation, as discussed in detail in “The 
Problem with Rights” in section 2.  
The seven articles included in my thesis, however, reflect very different strategies, 
perspectives and understandings for human rights, and also show the development 
and changing nature of my thinking vis-à-vis human rights. In the early stages of my 
career as a lawyer, international human rights law seemed to provide a rather neutral, 
objective and unproblematic basis for justice. Human rights were very much an 
unproblematic theory. Later, the practical limits and contingencies of human rights 
– human rights as practice – have become more apparent. Through human rights 
practice it became clear to me that, instead of providing clear standards, human 
rights offers more choices and alternatives than practitioners usually realize. As I 
see it today, human rights are simultaneously a theory and a practice. In a particular 
professional context or historical or cultural situation, a good human rights lawyer 
might want to highlight the claimed universal nature or standard-setting ability 
of human rights. Without doubt, there are situations when human rights can be 
a useful language for those who are on the margins and outside the clubs of the 
powerful. But in another context, one can promote justice or institutional priorities 
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by referring to the open, political and changing nature of rights. Understanding 
that human rights have this nature, and many other abstract and practical qualities 
is the key to understanding their power and appeal, and to avoiding any clichéd 
concept of rights. 
It is also necessary to say what I am not planning to do. In this synthesis I am 
not trying to develop a general theory or model of the operation of human rights in 
general. In the light of the wide and almost unlimited scope and undefined meaning 
of human rights and human rights talk, this would probably be an impossible task. I 
am mainly interested in the operation of human rights in the cases and perspectives 
that I raise in my seven articles.  
So I am not interested here, for example, in what (if anything) it means in practice 
for the states who are parties to the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights to recognize the right of everyone to work (Art. 6), their right to enjoyment 
in just and favourable conditions of work (Art. 7), or their right to be free from 
hunger (Art. 11). I am sure, however, that analysing these articles and many other 
articles in different UN and Council of Europe human rights conventions from a 
pragmatic perspective would be useful and interesting. 
In general, I think that well-meaning practitioners of human rights should engage 
in this type of critical evaluation (considering in what way treating the “right to 
work” or “right to be free from hunger” as human rights helps the unemployed or 
hungry to get work or food, for example) more often. It would be useful to know 
what kind of practical costs and benefits would emerge from these analyses. What 
does it mean in practice when states who are parties to the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights “recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”, or how precisely 
can the human rights of minorities assist us in helping Roma people in Europe? 
This type of approach is nothing new, but more pragmatic calculations of this type 
could assist us in seeing the real achievements of human rights and the amount 
of resources that are spent on often rather ineffective human rights bureaucracy 
and human rights talk.    
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8 the artiCLes 
As a lawyer and a cultural anthropologist (my Masters of Art involved the study 
of comparative religion, cultural anthropology and theoretical philosophy), my 
education has affected the themes of my articles. In October 1998 I was asked to 
deliver a speech on human rights in a multicultural society to a seminar organized 
by the Advisory Council on International Human Rights of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of Finland. When preparing my paper, I became interested in the debate 
regarding the universalism and relativism of human rights. I wanted to find out in 
what way the idea of different “cultures” challenges the concept of human rights. 
The starting point for my article was that multiculturalism cannot challenge 
the meaning of human rights. In my visits to South-East Asia – including visits 
to human rights institutions in Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia – I had 
never come across the opinion that human rights could be in any way negative 
or problematic. Usually my contacts, in both professional and non-professional 
contexts, had been very much in favour of human rights. In spite of having different 
cultural or religious backgrounds, it seemed to me that people generally wanted 
their human rights to be respected. Was this view of human rights as something 
self-evidently good an arrogant, or a Western, approach to rights? I wanted to 
explore my impressions in more detail, and gather further insights into the link 
between human rights and “culture” and the links between human rights and the 
Western origin it is claimed to have. 
These experiences and ideas affected me when I began to write the first article 
of my thesis, “Culture and Human Rights”.114  In this article I started from the 
standpoint of basic human rights literature that the goal of human rights is to create 
common rules for all people in the world. I noted that this is a challenging goal in 
view of the diversity of cultures, religions, lifestyles and values in the world and 
the conflicts engendered by them. In the human rights debate, the universality of 
rights has often been contested on the grounds that they are a product of Western 
culture and cannot therefore be applied universally.115 The concept of human 
rights was already being questioned by some anthropologists when the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was drafted. In 1947 the American Anthropological 
Association (AAA) issued a statement to the drafting committee in which it criticised 
114 This article has been published as Jari Pirjola, “Culture, Western Origin and the Universality of Human 
Rights”, Nordic Tidkskrift for Menneskerettigheter (Nordic Journal of Human Rights), Vol 23, 2005, No. 1. 
115 See Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, “Human Rights: Western Construct with Limited Applicability”, 
in Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab (eds.), Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, 1 (New 
York, 1980), p. 12.
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the concept of human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
AAA statement famously argued that “The Rights of Man in the twentieth century 
cannot be circumscribed by the standard of any single culture, or be dictated by 
the aspirations of any single people”.116   
In “Culture and Human Rights”, I argued that the culture concept and the 
Western origin of human rights are, however, in many ways problematic notions 
when challenging the universality of human rights. In spite of their culture or origin, 
human rights can serve as a key instrument and a yardstick. As to the culture 
concept, I considered the anthropological discussion according to which cultures 
are not normative, coherent, timeless or discrete systems that could justify human 
rights violations. “Cultures” are not free from power struggles, politics or growing 
global interaction. It is true, I noted, that the roots of human rights thinking lie in 
the European political and philosophical tradition, but human rights thinking has 
developed over a long period of time, and is the result of a process having various 
different underlying ideas and tensions which all are part of the “Western tradition”. 
I concluded the article by suggesting that the culture concept, or the so-called 
Western origin of human rights, cannot challenge the strengths and potentials 
inherent in human rights. I also argued that the “Western origin” criticism of human 
rights fails to take sufficient account of the fact that modern human rights did 
not arise harmoniously from its Western and Christian roots but arose as a result 
of continuing conflicts and tensions. Human rights are reactions to experiences 
of injustice, pain and fear arising from the human condition. These negative 
experiences could be turned into political goals and eventually into a binding human 
rights convention. I did not pay much attention to the other understandings of 
rights discussed in section 5: the indeterminacy, conflicts or paradoxes that affect 
the practical operation of human rights. I noted, however, that in practice many 
people are excluded from the universal protection of human rights. The practice 
of human rights is about power and politics, and whenever these elements are 
involved, there is a risk that some people are excluded.
The second article of my thesis (“Human Rights and the Exotic Other”) discussed 
human rights and culture from different perspectives and tried to develop the theme 
of “Culture and Western Origin”.117  The article discusses the tension between the 
claimed universal of human rights and any particular culture. I wanted to explore, 
how the human rights practitioner should deal with the paradox that the concept 
of human rights is linked to the idea of universality, while the concept of culture is 
linked to something non-universal, particular and traditional. 
116 “Statement on Human Rights”, reprinted in American Anthropologist Vol. 4 (1947).  
117 Universaalit Ihmisoikeudet ja “eksoottinen Toinen”. (In English: Universal human rights and the exotic 
Other.)  Oikeus 2007 (36); 1, pp. 107-114.
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At the outset of my article, I stated that human rights are important theoretical 
instruments for providing protection to all, irrespective of “culture”, religion, 
ethnicity or the political situation of the state. I started by noting that we need 
human rights standards because  judging the conduct of states towards minorities, 
for example, cannot be based only on the state’s own contingent political criteria for 
just treatment. But on the other hand it has been stated that this type of reference 
to human rights standards is a Western, European and even imperialistic approach 
which is not sensitive to the voices of particular cultures or religions, or what I called 
“exotic Others”. Why should we trust in universal human rights when there are also 
other universal vocabularies that might be more sensitive to particular ways of life? 
In this tension between something that is said to be universal and something 
that is said to be particular, a lawyer or an anthropologist can feel uncomfortable. 
If you promote so-called universal human rights you may feel like a colonial master 
transplanting Western standards and ideas to foreign and exotic places. Why should 
we emphasise the universality of rights, if we are only talking about one possible 
normative language of the modern world? Maybe this type of thinking sustains 
unjust structures in the world instead of changing them. 
But too much sensitivity to the voices of “Others” can also be confusing. Ideas 
of tolerant diversity or cultural sensitivity can ignore the rights of marginalised 
individuals, groups and communities. Those exotic Others that escape abuse, can 
wonder why promoters of diversity are sometimes so eager to respect legal pluralism 
or different normative standards operating in a social field.  Shouldn’t everyone be 
entitled to the freedom and equality that human rights conventions can sometimes 
promote?
I first explored the factors which can in some situations maintain the tension 
between universal human rights and particular cultures which is described above. 
I argued, for example, that in human rights discussions people’s identities are 
often wrongly thought to be based on their culture, religion or tradition. There 
would be serious problems with the moral and social claims of multiculturalism, 
if multiculturalism were taken to insist that a person’s identity must be defined by 
his or her community or religion, overlooking all his or her other affiliations (such 
as language, social relations, education, political views or civil roles) and giving 
automatic priority to inherited religion or tradition over reflection and choice. 
Other factors that can maintain the tension between human rights and culture 
include the usefulness of this tension from the point of view of power. Giving priority 
to culture or religion (instead of arguments emerging from rights language), can 
benefit those who are in powerful positions. Yet another factor is the emphasis on 
the “Western” nature of human rights. If human rights represent Western values, 
for example, why should other cultures be interested in them? Also, the traditional 
idea of culture as a coherent, non-political, traditional and exotic entity worthy 
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of protection, can create tension between human rights and the standards of the 
particular culture or religion. 
I concluded in the article that, in order to manage or deal with this tension 
between culture and human rights in a productive way, new approaches both to 
culture and to human rights are needed. First, it is necessary to view cultures as 
complex, changing and political units, and I had also discussed this in “Culture and 
Western Origin”. It is crucial to ask who, in a practical context, defines the “real” 
content of a religion, culture or tradition. It is important to notice that “culture” is 
two things at once, that is, a dual discursive construction. It is at one instant, the 
conservative re-construction of a reified essence, and at the next the path towards 
a new construction of an agency. 
Secondly, new approaches to human rights are needed. In order to overcome 
the perceived tension or antagonism, one must also try to clarify the concept of 
human rights in multicultural discussion. I suggested that we can simultaneously 
be sensitive to human rights language and be open to a variety of different cultural 
interpretations. Human rights must be seen to constitute both legal and political 
standards. But it is crucial to note that their scope is limited. Human rights do not 
aim to shape the life of their promoters, and do not represent all-encompassing 
worldviews or ways of life; neither do they provide a yardstick by which to evaluate 
cultures or religions in general. Human rights are not intended to replace Christian 
morals, the Buddhist way of life, or the possible vocabularies of duty or responsibility 
of the exotic Other. Rather they concentrate on political justice by setting up some 
basic normative structures and demands. 
The article suggested that in a multicultural context human rights must be 
approached as political claims to equal freedom in a universal perspective. In this 
view, the universality of human rights does not mean the imposition of Western 
values on other cultures, but instead aims for the universal recognition of pluralism 
and difference. But human rights recognise different religions, political convictions 
and ways of life only insofar as these differences are not against the very idea of 
human rights to equal freedom. From this perspective the concept of human rights 
must also remain open to different and conflicting interpretations in our pluralistic 
world – an idea I developed further in “Freedom of Religion”. 
The third article presented in my thesis, “Prohibition of Return: Non-refoulement 
in three human rights conventions”, is also closely linked to my experiences in 
professional life as a lawyer dealing with human rights and especially migration and 
refugee-related matters.118  As a legal adviser to the Finnish Red Cross, I noticed how 
useful the language of human rights can sometimes be. For advocacy and protection 
118 Jari Pirjola, “Palauttamiskielto. Non-refoulement periaatteesta kolmessa ihmisoikeussopimuksessa” (In 
English: Prohibition of Return: The Principle of Non-refoulement in three human rights conventions), 
Lakimies, no. 5, 2002, pp.  741-756. 
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work, the formal language of, say, the 1951 Refugee Convention, or the prohibition 
of inhuman treatment in the European Convention on Human Rights, provides civil 
society with an effective, formal and non-political vocabulary for speaking of asylum 
seekers or other vulnerable groups. However, after attending meetings of bodies 
such as the UNHCR in Geneva, or the ECRE (European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles) in different parts of Europe, I gradually started to become suspicious of the 
power of human rights law to limit the policy choices of governments. I started to 
pay attention to the fact that the regular reference to international human rights 
standards by NGOs, governments, or the EU did not seem to make any major 
difference to the concrete asylum practices of governments, whether at European 
or at national level.  This was surprising, as Article 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights is said to have “absolute” character and, according to James 
Hathaway, one of the leading experts on international refugee law, the definition 
of refugee was just a matter of putting five criteria together while applying the 
international standards established in international human rights conventions.119  
These experiences and confusions are the general background to my third article, 
“Prohibition of Return”, where I compare the principle of non-refoulement in three 
human rights conventions, namely the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status 
of refugees (the Refugee Convention), the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights (the ECHR) and the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture (the Torture 
Convention).  The aim of the article was to challenge and thus to clarify the meaning 
of non-refoulement in international law.  
All the conventions explored in the article include the principle of prohibition of 
return (adopting the French term, refoulement). The Refugee Convention describes 
refoulement as the act of returning a person to a country where “she or he fears for her 
or his life or freedom on account of her or his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group, or political opinion”. The ECHR addresses the principle 
of non-refoulement by stipulating that no-one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Torture Convention prohibits 
returning a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In the article I raised the 
following questions: Who is covered by the provision relating to the prohibition of 
return? What kind of ill-treatment may provide grounds for non-refoulement? And 
how probable must the risk of ill-treatment be in order to invoke the prohibition 
of return? I examined human rights conventions in a rather abstract, formal and 
technical manner, as norms whose substance can be interpreted and systematised 
from the text of the articles and commentaries, as well as from the decisions of the 
relevant monitoring or supervisory bodies.   
119 See James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, 1991).
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While working as a legal adviser at the headquarters of the Finnish Red Cross, 
I was a member of the Finnish Asylum Appeals Board for five years. Working in a 
judicial capacity at the Board, gradually made me aware of the indeterminate nature 
of human rights law for delivering decisions in concrete legal cases. It soon became 
clear to me that it was not difficult to reach opposing conclusions regarding the 
need for international protection by referring to the same human rights standard. 
When deciding cases at the Board with my colleagues, who had very different 
backgrounds and came from different institutions (e.g. police, border control, refugee 
aid organizations, or government ministries), I noticed that, because persecution 
or inhuman treatment are not and cannot be clearly defined in international law, 
the decisive factor for a decision on asylum seemed to be who had power to decide 
the case. Often the decision on a case could be predicted from the composition 
of the bench that was deliberating the appeal. How was that possible, when we 
were implementing international human rights standards, such as freedom from 
persecution or inhuman treatment, that are thought to set concrete and non-political 
standards for the treatment of people?
In my fourth article, “Shadows in Paradise. Exploring Non-refoulement as an 
Open Concept”, I wanted to explore my impressions of the indeterminate nature of 
international protection further, and to look at the open nature of international legal 
norms.120 In the first draft of the article, I focused on analysing the openness and 
indeterminacy of certain protection-related human rights concepts (e.g. persecution 
and cruel and inhuman treatment). During the drafting process, I sent this article 
to Professor Martti Koskenniemi for comments. He kindly replied to me that it 
is certainly interesting to analyse the open and indeterminate nature of human 
rights concepts, but that this is not enough. What is more interesting, he wrote, 
is to show how open concepts receive their meaning in practice and what kind of 
factors might be involved in this process.  Human rights concepts – leaving a lot 
of room for different kinds of interpretations – do not remain open in practice, but 
are always filled with meaning and substance. In order to look at the operation of 
rights we must not only speak of their abstract promise of protection, but also of 
their operation in practice, their bright and dark sides.  
In “Shadows in Paradise” I stated that the principle of non-refoulement contains 
a paradox. While states are committed, by signing the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
other key human rights conventions, to respecting the principle, its content is not 
established in international law. In other words, states have committed to a principle 
the content of which is indeterminate. Since no common definition exists, national 
120 Jari Pirjola, “Shadows in Paradise – Exploring Non-Refoulement as an Open Concept”, International Journal 
of Refugee Law, 19:4, 2007, pp. 639-660.  
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and international bodies have, in practice, extensive powers of discretion to give 
content to the terms “persecution”, “torture” and “degrading” or “cruel” treatment. 
I explored non-refoulement as an open and ambiguous concept. I noted that 
acknowledgement of the indeterminacy is important, as open concepts never remain 
so in practice but are always issued with content or interpreted. This approach called 
for a further question: How do interpretations come about, and what kind of factors 
influence them? I concluded that different national and international actors promote 
their own “correct” interpretations of this keystone of refugee protection. Thus this 
keystone of refugee protection also contains problems, biases and dark sides. 
The fifth article, “European Asylum Policy. Inclusions and Exclusion under the 
Surface of Human Rights Language”, has to do with my general interest in the 
operation and policy-making of the European Union, as well as my short training 
period in the European Commission.121 In 2008 I had an opportunity to participate 
in a four-month training programme for civil servants in the Commission’s unit on 
“Freedom, Justice and Liberty” in Brussels, dealing with activities regarding the 
creation of common asylum and migration policies for Europe.  
I noted that even though human rights were regularly mentioned in the official 
documents of the European Union concerning involuntary migration, they did not 
seem to have any major restrictive influence on the policy choices of the Commission 
in the area of asylum and migration in practice. Perhaps my impressions during 
my very short stay were wrong, but in any case I became interested in the tension 
between the European Union’s commitment to refugee protection, on the one hand, 
and the willingness to initiate control policies and strategies that seemed to be in 
opposition to this commitment, on the other hand – themes that I had worked with 
already in the Finnish Red Cross.  There seemed to be a commitment to protect but 
also the political will to exclude protection seekers by referring to human rights; this 
could be seen as a practical bad consequence (dark side) for asylum seekers in this 
context.  From these experiences, I wrote my article, “European Asylum Policy”.     
In the article I suggested that the tension between universal human rights 
commitments and the particular interests of the EU or its Member States is at the 
heart of the creation of a common asylum system. The article explores some of the 
inherent and structural contradictions as well as the sometimes hidden paradoxes 
that affect the creation of common asylum policies. In the article I wanted to examine 
human rights as a form of power, by linking the operation of human rights to the 
regimes of power it serves. I examined the development of the European asylum 
system as a process of including and excluding. I argued that open and abstract 
human rights commitments (human rights as theory) can provide only limited 
121 Jari Pirjola, European Asylum Policy – Inclusions and Exclusions under the Surface of Universal Human 
Rights Language”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 11, 2009, pp. 347-366.
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guidance on how to develop migration and asylum policies in Europe (human rights 
as practice). I concluded that we should not try to hide the development of the 
European asylum system behind the obscurity of legal reasoning or institutionalized 
rights language, but see the emerging common asylum system as the result of 
different and often conflicting priorities, power struggles and ideological influences.
The sixth article, “Freedom of religion in multi-faith Europe – protecting universal 
or Western sensibilities”122 (“Freedom of Religion”), explores, from theoretical and 
practical perspectives, some of the dilemmas regarding the freedom of religion in 
Europe. The paper is based on the speech that I delivered at the European Conference 
of the International Ombudsman Institute in October 2010. I suggested in the article 
that in the modern world there is a growing appeal for human rights, which are 
often thought to provide us with humanitarian and non-political guidance in an 
unpredictable world. One of the important and fundamental rights is the freedom 
of religion. Even though we have great trust in human rights at an abstract level, 
that should not prevent us from looking critically at their operation.
At the outset of the article I looked at the nature and scope of freedom of religion 
as a so-called universal human right. I concluded that, at an abstract level, freedom 
of religion provides wide and comprehensive protection to practise and manifest 
one’s religion. I then moved on to discuss why this claimed universality often turns 
out in professional practice to be a politics of the particular, a kind of European 
universalism. 
I tried to show that freedom of religion as a human right does not set us clear 
standards, but in practice receives its meaning through balancing different political, 
strategic, Christian and Western interests. This argument was made visible by the 
claims of four Muslim applicants asserting their rights in the European Court of 
Human Rights. Even though religious clothing, for example, is included in the 
definition and scope of human rights, the European Court of Human Rights has 
been of the opinion that states do not breach applicants’ freedom of religion when 
they prohibit the wearing of the headscarf. In the light of the cases discussed in the 
article, I wanted to ask if human rights (freedom of religion) can provide us with 
a neutral, objective and non-political basis for deciding contesting demands, or 
whether human rights in these cases mainly protect Christian ways of interpreting 
freedom of religion. 
Based on my analysis, I argued that we should not rush to celebrate the decisions 
of the human rights bodies, but look at them as policy decisions that include dark 
and bright sides depending on one’s perspective on the matter. Instead of asking 
122 Jari Pirjola:  ”Freedom of Religion in Multi-Faith Europe: Protecting Universal or Western Sensibilities?”Nordic 
Journal of Human Rights, 29:1 (2011), pp.  38–55
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whether the decisions of the human rights courts were “right” or “wrong”, I wanted 
to uncover the contextual specificity of the making of these judgements.
The central issue was to discuss why certain interpretations of freedom of religion 
might be privileged in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, and 
how the contingent product of the “truth” (the judgement) could be contested. I 
concluded that, even though human rights and human rights bodies are valuable 
institutions, their practical consequences should not be viewed as beyond critical 
reflection. It is necessary to allow critical views to be heard, in order to avoid clichéd 
concepts of human rights and to advance the many potentials included in human 
rights language. I argued that the main task of the critical approach to the practice 
of human rights, is to try to keep visible the circular relationship between rights 
and politics that is always involved in the application of human rights. 
The seventh article of my thesis, “The Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland 
as a National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) under the Optional Protocol to the 
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment”, focuses more on the institutional side of human rights 
protection.123 The article analyses and assesses the current role, and the strengths 
and weaknesses of the Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland (POF) as a national 
preventive mechanism (NPM) under the OPCAT. In this article, I asked if the POF 
is an appropriate body to be designated as the NPM. I discussed in rather formal 
way whether the POF meets the minimum standards required under the OPCAT 
for an NPM in terms of mandate, powers and working methods. What are the 
strengths and weaknesses of the POF? Finally, what, if any, legislative changes are 
needed for the institution of the POF so that it is possible for the Ombudsman to 
carry out his or her activities as an NPM in an independent and effective manner? 
I looked at the requirements of the OPCAT, and compared these with the mandate 
and working methods of the POF.  
I concluded in the article that, as the requirements of the OPCAT regarding 
the NPM are not described in detail, the current mandate of the Ombudsman is in 
conformity with at least the minimum requirements of the OPCAT. I concluded by 
indicating some strengths and some weaknesses of the institution of the Ombudsman 
in regard to the requirements of the OPCAT. 
123 Jari Pirjola: “The Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland as a National Preventive Mechanism under the 
Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment”, Nordic Journal of International Law 77, 2008, pp. 163-174.  
74
9 methoDs
The articles use different legal strategies and writing techniques in discussing human 
rights. There are many ways to approach and understand human rights, since 
different professional or academic contexts and situations require different strategies 
and languages. One could say that my collection of articles is methodologically 
eclectic. I use concepts, techniques and approaches that draw on traditional 
legal writing and legal analysis (in “Prohibition of Return” and “OPCAT article”), 
approaches that use more critical legal writing (in “Shadows in Paradise”, “European 
Asylum Policy” and “Freedom of Religion”), and concepts and approaches that are 
affected by discussions and methodologies of cultural anthropology (in “Culture 
and Human Rights” and “Human Rights and the Exotic Other”).  
In different phases of the writing process I have, at a general level, found useful 
the five strategies that Martti Koskenniemi has outlined for the management of the 
tension between human rights and sovereignty.124 The strategies are: (1) human 
rights formalism, which examines rights as they are laid down in the international 
instruments. In this approach questions of historical context or moral legitimacy are 
deferred. Formal validity of human rights is enough, buttressed by commentaries 
on how rights should be implemented; (2) human rights fundamentalism, which 
mystifies the essence of human rights. It uses language of essentialist notions 
such as “liberty” or “human dignity”. In this way it loses its critical character; (3) 
human rights scepticism, which claims that human rights have no role for politics. 
Human rights are an irrational strand in liberal theory, “nonsense upon stilts” to 
use Bentham’s expression. Rights become another strategic device in what is seen 
as an irreducible struggle for power; (4) cosmopolitan democracy, which accepts 
that human rights depend on political decision-making and therefore insists on 
democratic international procedures and fair play. Three elements form its basis: 
constitutionalism, democracy and rights. Even though an important strategy, it 
may underestimate the role of institutional power and bad faith. Institutions and 
procedures can freeze the justification of privileges; and (5) radical democracy, 
which emphasises the role of power in the democratic process.  In radical democracy, 
to assert a right will remain an attempt to fill the space of the universal by what 
is particular. Radical democracy attacks the fixed or harmonious aspect of rights, 
and highlights their role in the struggle for hegemony and in the articulation of 
antagonisms and exclusions. 
124 For detailed analysis of the strategies, see Martti Koskenniemi, “Human Rights, Politics and Love”, Nordic 
Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter (Nordic Journal of Human Rights), Vol 4, 2001, pp. 41-44.
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The articles “Culture and Human Rights” and “Human Rights and the Exotic 
Other” draw on discussions in the field of cultural anthropology and human rights 
of the concept of culture. Since the 1980s, the entire concept of culture has been 
subject to reassessment and international approaches, as I discussed in more detail 
in the articles. For example, James Clifford and George E. Marcus’s Writing Culture 
(1986), and Richard G. Fox and Barbara J. King’s Anthropology Beyond Culture 
(2002) provided useful theoretical and methodological insights that affected me 
when I drafted the article.125 In the field of human rights, I was much influenced by 
my dialogue with Dr Heiner Bielefeld, who introduced me to his article, “Western 
versus Islamic Human Rights Conceptions? A Critique of Cultural Essentialism in 
the Discussion of Human Rights” (2000). “Culture and Human Rights” also received 
some inspiration from my short visits to human rights institutions in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia (2000) and Manila, the Philippines (2002). In the Philippines I had, with 
the assistance of the University of the Philippines (UPI), an opportunity to carry 
out a short field trip to discuss the relationship between culture and human rights 
with several local non-governmental human rights organisations.   
The method I used in “Prohibition of Return” was more formalistic, technical 
and comparative. I collected and analysed legal materials, including articles and 
case law, in order to compare the scope of protection provided by three human 
rights conventions.  The article also reflects the fact that I participated in a course 
on refugee law given by Professor James Hathaway in Helsinki. Hathaway made 
international human rights law appear very systematic and formal. 
The articles “Shadows in Paradise” and “European Asylum Policy” reflect a more 
critical approach to article writing. During my work with international human rights 
law, for example for the Asylum Appeals Board or in the office for the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman of Finland, I had noted that in most cases related to human rights, 
it is not difficult to come to opposing results by balancing human rights norms in 
different ways. But is it not true that appropriate and context sensitive “balancing” 
of different perspectives, priorities and workable solutions is a good example of what 
policy work is all about? And should human rights standards not set limits to these 
types of policy considerations? Human rights law in daily practice started to appear 
more and more as something useful, but also problematic:  indeterminate, political, 
conflictive, manipulable and abstract. What do we promote when we “promote 
human rights”, and how do we know that our balancing of conflicting priorities is the 
right one? From my practical perspective as a legal adviser, this was an interesting 
puzzle, as human rights are said to be something that should limit authorities and 
be outside politics. The more I referred to human rights as external standards, the 
125 James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.), Writing Culture. The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography 
(University of California Press, 1986), and Richard G. Fox and Barbara J. King (eds.), Anthropology Beyond 
Culture (Berg, Oxford, 2002).
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more human rights started to resemble theology. The more appropriate “balancing” 
was needed, the more human rights started to resemble policy work instead of legal 
work. During the drafting process of “Shadows in Paradise” and “European Asylum 
Policy”, I became more interested in the critical approaches to human rights. I 
found the traditional way of looking at human rights useful but very limited. As I 
saw it from a professional point of view, only a critical approach to human rights 
can contribute to an understanding of the emancipatory possibilities as well as the 
limitations of human rights.  
In “Freedom of Religion” I wanted to focus on the operation of one human right 
(freedom of religion as a human right) and ask how it operates in a professional 
context. I analysed selected decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, and 
asked how freedom of religion operates in these cases. I tried to connect some aspects 
of critical human rights theory to the practice of the European Court of Human 
Rights. I was also inspired by the “Foucauldian” framework, which is interested in 
the production of truths and in how to give “voice to those produced as other by the 
binary truths of modernity, and thereby contesting the Eurocentric and masculinist 
standards which have been legitimated as universal”.126
The methodology in the OPCAT article was a little bit different. In 2006-2007 
I participated in a distance-learning course on the prevention of torture which was 
organised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
Association for the Prevention of Torture. I was assigned a tutor in Geneva, and I 
drafted seven short papers (assignments) in the field of torture prevention. In order 
to pass the course and receive an Oxford University Diploma I had to write a final 
document (the so-called final assignment) dealing with the prevention of torture. 
The OPCAT article was this final assignment. 
In different phases of writing I received comments, advice and relevant legal 
materials from my tutor in Geneva, with whom I was in electronic correspondence 
throughout the course.  The aim of the final assignment was to examine the articles 
of the OPCAT Treaty as they are laid down in the international instrument. I was 
not interested in the historical context or the powers or political questions regarding 
the practical operation of the National Preventive Mechanism. In this case formal 
validity and an analysis of human rights was enough, buttressed by commentaries 
on how rights should be implemented. 
It is clear that the methodologies I have used in my articles reveal only partial 
perspectives on human rights. Many other strategies could also have been used. 
My seven articles reveal some aspects, understandings and contexts regarding the 
operation of human rights, while simultaneously hiding some other aspects that 
126 Dianne Otto, “Everything is Dangerous: Some Post-structural Tools For Rethinking the Universal Knowledge 
Claims of Human Rights Law”, Australian Journal of Human Rights 1, Vol 17, 1999,p. 1-30.
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would require a different kind of methodology. Being (also) an anthropologist I see 
my articles as if they were “villages” or “case studies” that I investigated during an 
anthropological fieldtrip. Like a good anthropologist I have made a lot of observations 
and filled my notebook with interesting information, but I have also failed to ask 
the right questions and have ignored many voices. I have tried to tell the truth 
but not the whole truth. In the world of “rights” that would not be possible. My 
anthropological journey has also changed me, and this is reflected in my articles 
as well as in the more self-critical parts of this synthesis.  
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10 theoretiCaL anD PraCtiCaL PersPeCtives  
 on human rights in my artiCLes 
Before I conclude this synthesis, I must briefly discuss my articles in the frame of 
reference I have tried to set up in the previous pages. In other words, what kind of 
theoretical and practical perspectives to rights emerge from my seven articles in 
the light of the frame of reference I have set out in this synthesis? 
In “Culture and Human Rights” and “Human Rights and the Exotic Other” 
I explored, at a rather abstract and formal level, whether rights are culturally 
dependent, and the meaning of the claim that the roots of human rights lie in the 
Western tradition. In general, I was interested in the question of whether people 
from different cultures and religions could find an overlapping consensus on basic 
common principles.127 The understanding of human rights in these two articles 
draws, for example, on the research of Dr Heiner Bielefeldt who, drawing especially 
on Rawls’ political philosophy, had argued that human rights have always been a 
contested political issue. For this reason, human rights language can also play an 
important role in a multicultural context. The strength of human rights language 
lies in the fact that the human rights concept is not the result of any natural or 
organic development based on the genes of a particular culture. Thus any cultural 
essentialist occupation, such as the “Occidentalisation” or “Islamisation” of human 
rights should be rejected. This would not mean that cultural aspects of human rights 
would become meaningless for the concept of rights. On the contrary, human rights 
should be cherished politically, as their cultural and religious aspects can provide 
motives and practical commitments for human rights.
Hence the key question of the articles was how to maintain the connection 
between human rights as rules and religious or cultural traditions without being 
trapped in a cultural essentialism. In “Culture and Human Rights” I argued that 
even abstract human rights commitments can have an important role in finding a 
127 As is well known, Rawls shifted from a moral to a political conception of the person in his Political Liberalism 
(Columbia University Press, 1993) because he regarded the kind of moral autonomy he had advocated in ‘A 
Theory of Justice’  as too controversial a premise to serve as the basis of an “overlapping consensus” in a liberal, 
plural and multicultural society. According to Rawls, the main aim of ‘Political Liberalism’ is to show that the 
“idea of the well ordered society in the Theory [of Justice, JP] may be reformulated so as to take account of 
the fact of reasonable pluralism. To do this it transforms the doctrine of justice as fairness as presented in 
the Theory  into a political conception of justice that applies to the basic structure of society. Transforming 
justice as fairness into a political conception of justice requires reformulating as political conceptions the 
component ideas that make up the comprehensive doctrine of justice as fairness.” See John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 2005) p. xli.  Compare Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, (Princeton 
University Press 2002) pp. 108-109.  
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consensus on basic normative standards in our increasingly multicultural societies. 
In the multicultural context, human rights can operate as legal and political claims 
to equal freedom in a universal perspective.  Human rights language can be seen 
as a political means to promote equality and freedom in practice.128 This is without 
doubt a bright side of human rights.
Heiner Bielefeldt has pointed out that: 
Unlike Islam and other religions, which claim to shape the whole lives 
of their adherents, human rights do not represent an all-encompassing 
“weltanschaung” or the way of life, nor do they provide a yardstick by 
which to evaluate cultures and religions in general. Human rights are 
not necessarily the highest manifestation of the ethical spirit in human 
history either, because they are not entitled to replace, for instance, 
Christian demands of love, Islamic solidarity, or the Buddhist ethic of 
compassion. Rather they concentrate on political justice by setting up 
some basic normative standards.129
The purpose of human rights norms is not to provide anyone with a comprehensive 
world view but to assist in creating standards and institutions for the finding of an 
overlapping consensus in practice.130 My article suggested that the liberating and 
positive role of rights in a multicultural context cannot be denied by referring to 
“cultures” or the “Western” origin of human rights. Human rights, as abstract and 
indeterminate language, can serve as useful political and legal instruments when 
we try to solve the conflicting demands of plural societies. The promise of human 
rights to end domination and oppression explains their legitimacy. So even though 
we might find human rights problematic in practice, as discussed in section 5, people 
continually find human rights indispensable.131
In “Human Rights and the Exotic Other’” I also discussed human rights from 
a rather theoretical and abstract perspective. I argued that to manage the tension 
between the concepts of culture and abstract human rights, new approaches not 
only to culture but also to the human rights concept are needed. In a multicultural 
128 This is done, for example, by emphasizing a fair balance between conflicting interests or by containing and 
managing conflicting demands in a democratic and peaceful manner. However, the fact that the publication 
of cartoons in Denmark was protected by the freedom of speech did not prevent the spread of a violent 
response around the world.  
129 Heiner Bielefeldt, “Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 17, 1995, pp. 
588-617 at p. 588. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Michael Goodhart, “Neither Relative nor Universal: A Response to Donelly”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 
30, 2008, pp.183-193, at p.192. “To advocates and people struggling for democracy, human dignity, and social 
justice, it really doesn’t matter very much whether human rights are universal, metaphysically well-grounded 
or whatever. It just matters that they are useful and available to anyone, that they get the job done”, (p. 193). 
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context, human rights must be approached as claims to equal freedom. With this 
view, the universality of human rights does not mean an imposition of Western 
values on other cultures, but instead aims for the universal recognition of pluralism 
and difference. But in practice human rights recognise different religions, political 
convictions and ways of life only insofar as these differences are not contrary to 
the very idea of human rights to equal freedom. From this abstract and formal 
perspective, the concept of human rights must also remain open to different and 
conflicting interpretations in our pluralistic world – an idea I discussed in “Freedom 
of Religion” from a more practical perspective. 
Human rights as:
• universal standards
• legal and political claims to equal freedom
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figure 3  In “Culture and Human Rights” and in “Human Rights and the Exotic Other” I was mainly 
focusing on human rights from a theoretical perspective.  
Comment
Viewing these two articles afterwards from the perspective of this synthesis, one 
notes that in “Culture and Human Rights” and “Human Rights and the Exotic Other” 
I treated human rights in a rather formal manner, mainly highlighting the potential 
of rights language. Human rights were discussed from a theoretical perspective. 
I did not give much time to the indeterminacy critique or to the conflicting and 
political nature of human rights. Maybe the argument that human rights can create 
common rules for all people in the world is an arrogant and imperialistic idea? 
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I suggested that one strength of rights language is that the human rights system 
could provide a foundation for an ongoing dialogue between different cultures 
and religions, which is probably the case. 
Looking from a practical perspective, it is clear that in concrete situations the 
solution for religious or cultural conflicts or tensions does not come from human 
rights themselves or from rights language. In practice human rights norms can 
only provide temporary and contestable solutions to controversial issues like the 
conflicts between freedom of religion and freedom of speech, and can only provide 
limited guidance to solving concrete questions, such as whether Muslim students 
should be allowed to wear the headscarf at university.132  Human rights are not 
meaningless either. They can provide a universal language and a promise of justice, 
and serve as principles that can guide thinking and structure the balancing process 
for deciding on conflicting demands. Human rights can also assist in challenging 
existing practices. Expressions of rights can “mediate” between individual and 
universal interests. Human rights can create a political language for universal 
demands from an individual perspective. Thus, one practical potential benefit 
of rights lies in their acting as important “mediating” principles around which 
communal values and individual interests can be organized.133 
As discussed in section 4, human rights can sometimes operate as formal legal 
rules or standards. For example, the principle of “non-refoulement” makes it possible 
for everyone in his or her particular situation to make reference to this keystone 
principle of refugee protection. Human rights as rules and principles formed the 
research question in my article “Prohibition of Return”, where I analysed three 
132 This is because different rights pull in different directions and a “fair balance” between different rights is very 
context dependent. Dominic McGoldrick has written that human rights thinking can, however, provide a useful 
language, discourse and, in some cases, institutional structure for mediating and resolving headscarf disputes. 
He also notes that “there are also dangers in adopting human rights analysis. It has its own weaknesses and 
blind spots.  It is evident the human approach embodies a certain set of concepts, boundaries and discourse. 
We have also illustrated that within each human rights categorization there can be found a complex balancing 
of claims and interest. The balance is very context dependent and may reveal tensions that pull in different 
directions. The human rights outcome for a headscarf-hijab issue may thus vary from one state to another. 
Within the ECHR system the European Court explains this by reference to the ’margin of appreciation’”. 
See McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion: The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe, (Hart, 2006) pp. 
31, 308. As an example of balancing, see Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Application No. 44774/98, Grand Chamber 
Judgement of 10 November 2005.
133 Duncan Kennedy suggests that rights mediate between law and policy. Rights arguments involve something 
more than the logic of the valid, because they explain and justify rules, rather than merely apply them, but 
they are less subjective than pure policy arguments, because of their “factoid” character. See Duncan Kennedy, 
The Critique of Adjudication (Harvard University Press paperback edition 1997) pp. 319-320.
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selected human rights conventions as sets of legal rules and principles that can create 
standards for the protection of asylum seekers against involuntary return. In the 
article I discussed the principle of non-refoulement as a legal rule and a principle 
that sets limits against expelling asylum seekers or refugees and returning them to 
their home countries. I noted that Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights “prohibits” returning anyone to an area where he or she would be subjected 
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
In “Prohibition of Return” I compared and analysed selected human rights 
norms as universal and legally enforceable legal rules. My strategy was, again, 
rather abstract and formal, since I looked at human rights law as laid down in the 
three human rights conventions I explored. In my article I was interested in the 
formal application and validity of the relevant articles. Based on my legal analysis 
of the relevant articles, I claimed that the power of the principle of non-refoulement 
lies in its ability to set clear limits to the expulsion or return of asylum seekers. I 
claimed that the “non-political decisions” of the supervisory bodies (the ECHR 
and the Torture Committee) can also in practice create standards for the scope of 
non-refoulement.
The principle of non-refoulement:
• in human rights conventions
• as decisions of supervisory bodies
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figure 4  The article “Prohibition of Return” discussed human rights mainly as standards and principles. 
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Comment
Looking at the operation of rights from the perspective of this introduction, and in the 
context of a more critical discussion of human rights, one notes that in “Prohibition 
of Return” I did not pay much attention to the indeterminacy or open nature of 
human rights norms, which in practice might compromise the claimed standard-
setting ability of human rights norms. I did, however, refer to the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Ireland v. United Kingdom, for example, which 
acknowledges the open nature of Article 3. The Court held that ill-treatment must 
attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The 
Court stated, as is well known, that in practice the assessment of this minimum is, 
in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such 
as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, 
the sex, age, and state of health of the victim.134 In this article I did not explore how 
open rights receive their meaning in practice, or what factors could be involved in 
this process.  This was something I wanted to do in “Shadows in Paradise”.
The purpose and the strategy of “Prohibition of Return” was, however, not to 
examine the operation of rights in a critical manner (to look, for example, at what it 
means in practice when rights are open and conflicting), but to produce a technical 
and comparative analysis of the relevant articles of the three selected human rights 
conventions (for the benefit of colleagues). I explored rights as something rather 
non-political and absolute. I also underlined the non-political role of the supervisory 
bodies to set standards for the scope of non-refoulement. In my article I did not 
consider the fact that in practice it is not difficult to include and exclude by referring 
to open legal rules or legal definitions.  
It is clear that the interpretation of Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights is constantly developing in the light of decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights. The same applies to the UN Torture Convention and the 
decisions of the UN Committee Against Torture. Another article would be needed to 
reflect on recent developments in a proper manner. In the light of my article, a few 
points need to be raised regarding recent important decisions of the ECHR: in the 
case of Sufi and Elmi v. United Kingdom (application nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07,) 
the ECHR stated that Article 3 does not as such preclude Contracting States from 
placing reliance on the existence of an internal flight alternative in their assessment 
of an individual’s claim that there would be a real risk that a return to his country 
of origin would be  proscribed under Article 3. In Salah Sheek v. the Netherlands 
(1948/04), the Court noted that reliance to on an internal flight alternative does 
134 Ireland v. United Kingdom, ECHR Judgement of 18 January 1978, A 25, at p.65.
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not, however, affect the responsibility of the expelling Contracting State to ensure 
that the applicant is not, as a result of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment 
contrary to Article 3. Therefore, before relying on an internal flight alternative, 
certain guarantees must be in place (an ability to travel to and settle in the area, 
for example).  
In the case of Sufi and Elmi v. United Kingdom, the ECHR further noted that a 
situation of “general violence” is not the only risk that a returnee may face when he or 
she returns to his or her country of origin (Somalia in this case). The returnee might 
also need protection against the “real risk of ill-treatment on account of the human 
rights situation”. In Salah Sheek v. the Netherlands, the Court held that the socio-
economic and humanitarian conditions in the country of return did not necessarily 
have a bearing, and certainly not a decisive bearing, on the question of whether 
the person concerned would face a real risk of ill-treatment within the meaning of 
Article 3. However, the fundamental importance of Article 3 means that the Court 
retains “a degree of flexibility” to prevent expulsion in very exceptional cases. The 
Court is of the opinion that even humanitarian reasons can prevent expulsion in 
a situation where the humanitarian grounds against expulsion are “compelling”. 
In the recent case of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (30696/09) the Court stated 
that it had not excluded the possibility that the responsibility of the State under 
Article 3 might be engaged in respect of treatment where an applicant, who was 
wholly dependent on state support, found himself faced with official indifference 
in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity. 
It easy to see that in the above cases the Court is very much relying on open legal 
language. The need for protection is dependent on “human dignity”, “compelling 
humanitarian grounds”, “general violence” or “a human rights situation”.  As 
discussed in sections 4 and 5, Article 3 can thus in practice have good or bad 
consequences for the person seeking international protection. 
 
In “Shadows in Paradise” I discussed human rights from a different perspective, 
and wanted to look at them not only as a theory but also in practice.  I wanted to be 
more critical of the ability of human rights to set clear and objective legal rules or 
standards in professional practice. At the time of writing, I felt that human rights 
formalism – discussed in my “Prohibition of Return” – gives an incomplete picture 
of the operation of human rights.  Thus, I felt it necessary to merge the theory with 
the practice and explore the practical operation of rights: the problems, limitations, 
paradoxes, and ambiguities that in some practical situations can compromise the 
abstract promise of the non-refoulement principle.  
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In particular, I explored the following paradox: while states have committed 
themselves to respect the principle of non-refoulement by signing the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and other key human rights conventions, the scope of the principle 
(the definition of persecution or inhuman treatment, for example) is not clearly 
established in international law. In other words, states have committed themselves 
to uphold human rights, the practical scope of which is indeterminate. Since no 
common definition exists in practice, national and international bodies have quite 
extensive powers of discretion to give content to terms like “persecution”, “torture”, 
and “degrading” or “cruel” treatment.  
Thus, in practice, the implementation of open and developing human rights 
concepts requires interpretation, prioritising and an analysis of costs and benefits. 
The practical operation of human rights – its bright and dark sides – is linked to that 
process. Different national and international actors – NGOs, immigration authorities, 
intergovernmental organisations, human rights institutions, ombudsmen – seldom 
share the same practical interpretation of human rights; instead, different human 
rights experts promote their own interpretations of human rights. As I argued in 
“Shadows in Paradise”, an interpretation depends on the values and priorities of 
the people and institutions involved in the particular case. For this reason it is not 
impossible that one interpretation of human rights becomes institutionalized, and 
thus legitimates existing circumstances.  
I noted in my article that various interpretations of human rights law seem quite 
stable within institutions. For instance, the Court of Human Rights has ultimately 
been fairly constant in interpreting Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in recent years. National authorities, courts or human rights organisations 
defending refugee rights, such as the UNHCR, often seem to promote their own, 
“correct” interpretations of human rights. As a result, the inalienable and absolute 
right guaranteed in a human rights convention becomes an issue of the politics of 
these institutions.135 This can be good or bad depending on one’s perspective on the 
matter. The article also discusses the question of whether technical human rights 
language can be used to describe economic injustice, loss of human dignity or loss 
of a clean environment. 
Even though the operation of non-refoulement can, as discussed above, 
have dark and bright sides in practice, it is a valuable principle, the objective of 
which is to protect people from serious human rights violations in practice. The 
principle has also opened up a debate between political and legal actors on a state’s 
responsibility to protect people against expulsion, and this can also have useful 
practical consequences for those who are seeking international protection.  
135 Mary Douglas claims that all thinking is dependent upon institutions. See Mary Douglas, How Institutions 
Think (Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp.45-53.
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The principle of non-refoulement as:
• a legal obligation of states
• a human right standard and principle
• language of pain and suﬀering
Non-refoulement as:
• an indeterminate and ambiguous concept
• politics of the institutions
• insuﬃcient language to tackle complex social reality
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figue 5  The theoretical and practical understandings of human rights as analysed in “Shadows in 
Paradise” are summarised in figure 5.
The article “European Asylum Policy” was also about the abstract promise of 
rights and their practical implementation. In other words, what is the meaning of 
human rights in the creation of a common European Asylum Policy? The article 
explored the tension between the human rights commitments of the EU and the 
practical interests of the EU Member States in the development of the European 
Asylum Policy.  Again, the interplay between the theory and the practice of human 
rights emerged. On the one hand, the EU has importantly committed itself to respect 
the absolute right of asylum and human rights standards. On the other hand, in 
practice human rights law clearly seems to be unable to harness the expedient 
policy goals of the EU or Member States. 
I stated in the article that open and abstract human rights commitments or 
rights language could only provide limited guidance on how to develop migration 
and asylum policies for the EU. Depending on one’s priorities between universal 
and particular interests, it was easy, by referring to the same human right 
commitments, to include or exclude asylum seekers. In the context of the European 
Union, the claimed absoluteness of human rights standards is easily lost and 
disagreement can occur as to where, when, and how human rights protection 
should be arranged.  
Thus, it seemed that human rights language did not restrict governments from 
managing asylum and migration flows (e.g. non-entry policies) in an “expedient” 
manner. As open and abstract rights cannot guide policies, we must raise the 
87
question of whether the EU invokes universal human rights mainly in order to 
promote its own particular interests and objectives, thus giving its human rights 
commitments the flavour of hypocrisy.  
Commitment of states to respect human
rights and refugee law in the creation of 
European asylum policy. 
Human rights as:
• indeterminate concepts
• particular interest and power
• a process of including and excluding
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figure 6  The theoretical and practical understanding of human rights as analysed in “European Asylum 
Policy” is summarised in figure 6. 
Comment 
Since the drafting of my article on European Asylum Policy, many political and 
legal developments have taken place in the gradual process of establishing the 
Common European Asylum System. The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 
December 2009. It provides the EU with new institutions and working methods 
to better tackle migration related challenges in Europe. Whereas the Amsterdam 
Treaty aimed at creating common minimum standards for asylum, the Treaty 
of Lisbon focus on creating common asylum system. This includes the common 
interpretation and application of key protection related concepts that was rather 
critically analyzed in my article. According to the article 78 of the Treaty, “the Union 
shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary 
protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national 
requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of 
non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 
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28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, 
and other relevant treaties.”
In addition, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights received the same legal value as the European Union treaties. 
The Charter includes many provisions that deal with international protection. For 
example, according to article 19 of the Charter “no one may be removed, expelled 
or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be 
subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment”.
One important practical tool for bringing more harmonization to European 
Asylum standards in EU level, includes the possibility of the European Court of 
Justice to give preliminary rulings (without preliminary restrictions) in the area 
of freedom, security and justice, including asylum and immigration matters (see 
for example Judgment of the European Court of Justice  in Case  C-277/11 on  22 
November 2012 dealing Council Directive  2004/83/EC on minimum standards 
for qualification for refugee status or subsidiary protection status or Case C-69/10  
dealing Directive 2005/85/EC). 
Another important policy development since the publication of my article, is the 
establishment of the European Asylum Support Office (Regulation No 439/2010 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 establishing a European 
Asylum Support Office). The task of the support office is to play a practical role in 
the concrete development of the Common European Asylum System. The agency 
was established with the aim of enhancing practical cooperation on asylum matters, 
and helping Members States fulfill their European and international obligations to 
give protection to people in need of protection. The idea is that the Asylum Support 
Office acts as a center for expertise on asylum.  
In this context, it is also necessary to mention the Stockholm program which set 
out the European Union’s priorities for the area of justice, freedom, and security 
for the period of 2010-2014. According to Stockholm program, the EU must, for 
example, develop its integrated border management and visa polices to make 
legal access to Europe efficient for non-EU nationals. It is stated that on the one 
hand strong border controls are necessary to counter illegal immigration and 
cross border crime, but at the same time access must be guaranteed to those in 
need of international protection. According to Stockholm Program, the EU must 
develop comprehensive and flexible migration policy that centre on solidarity and 
responsibility, and address both the needs of EU countries and migrants. 
It remains to be seen what will be the practical results of the above mentioned 
and pending policy and legal developments for the asylum seekers seeking 
protection at the southern borders of Europe, for example. The tension between 
universal commitments and particular interest of States discussed in my article, 
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has not disappeared. In my view, many concerns and tensions that I discussed in 
my rather theoretical analysis deserves attention also in post-Lisbon era.
As to the current state of common European Asylum System, I want to end 
this comment to the very practical observations provided in April 2013 by the 
Statewatch after their visit to asylum reception center in one EU country Greece:
“We visited the Pikpa Centre in early April 2013, an open facility run by 
volunteers in a building provided by the municipality. The Centre is outside 
the capital town of Mytilene, near the airport. It consists of a concrete building 
containing a kitchen and a collection of small wooden buildings in which people 
sleep, some 6 or 8 to a room, on bare mattresses. They have all arrived following 
long journeys to Greece from Syria, Afghanistan and further beyond. The people 
from Afghanistan left there over four months ago. Each day 20-30 people arrive 
in Mytilene by boat. Some were told en route that they could get a taxi to Athens 
from the island; clearly impossibility even had they enough money for the fare.
Some receive papers (not asylum) to go to Athens or move on elsewhere. Others 
stay on the island, in limbo and entirely dependent on the goodwill, financial 
support and voluntary work of the people of the island. When we visited there 
were 30 people in the Centre. They included single young men in their late teens 
and early twenties, some older people including mothers and fathers with children, 
and unaccompanied children. They have had no opportunity to ask for asylum 
in Greece because the Port Police send them to the Coastguards, who then send 
them back to the Port Police (who will not accept an asylum claim). They have 
not seen a lawyer and are told by the authorities that it is only possible to do so 
if they get arrested, but the police won’t arrest them. If anyone does manage to 
be arrested, police say it will mean five months in prison or a police cell before 
they can submit an asylum claim. Two of the young men had arrived in Molyvos, 
a tourist village in the north of the island. They walked for two days across the 
mountains to get to Mtyilene town.
A significant number of the people in Pikpa today have been there for 17 or 18 
days, not knowing if they will ever see a lawyer, be able to claim asylum, or move 
out of the Centre. It is clear that the EU’s Common European Asylum System is 
nowhere near in place on this island and is unlikely ever to be, especially in the 
context of the economic crisis.”
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In “Freedom of Religion” I explored freedom of religion in theory and practice. 
I again examined, from both theoretical and practical perspectives, some of the 
dilemmas regarding the application of freedom of religion in Europe. First of all I 
looked briefly at the nature and scope of freedom of religion as a so-called universal 
human rights norm in international human rights law. My starting point was the 
idea that human rights can provide us with neutral, objective and non-political 
guidance in multi-faith societies.  
I then discussed why this claimed universality and neutral non-political aspect 
often turns out in professional practice to be a politics of the particular – a kind of 
European universalism. I tried to show that in professional practice, the freedom of 
religion as a human right does not set us clear standards, but receives its meaning 
through balancing different kinds of political, strategic, Christian and Western 
interests. I argued that even though freedom of religion is in theory said to be 
a universal right, in practice it can also protect particular and European ways of 
understanding freedom of religion. In the article, this was made visible by the claims 
of four Muslim applicants asserting their rights in the ECHR.136  
Freedom of religion as:
• universal human right that protects everyone
• human right that can set limits to the policy choices of states
Freedom of religion as:
• politics
• Western and Christian concept
• practice that protects existing privileges
T
H
E
O
R
Y
P
R
A
C
T
IC
E
figure 7  The theoretical and practical understandings of human rights in “Freedom of Religion” can 
be summarised in figure 7. 
136 See also the Case of Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom (15.1.2013) regarding the rights of Christians to 
manifest their religion. 
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The OPCAT article also focuses on the interplay and tension between human 
rights commitments, and the practical implementation of those rather indeterminate 
commitments. The article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland (POF) as a National Preventive Mechanism 
(NPM) under the OPCAT. The mandate of the POF did not reveal inconsistencies 
that would prevent the Ombudsman from being designated as the NPM for Finland. 
In the Protocol, the requirements of the NPM are described in rather indeterminate 
manner, so the current mandate of the Ombudsman is in conformity with at least 
the minimum requirements of the OPCAT. As I noted, among other things, the 
strengths of the Ombudsman included a strong and independent mandate and 
extensive powers to investigate and take action with regard to people deprived of 
their liberty.  
I noted that the new Protocol and the new visiting mechanism are without 
doubt an important new human rights mechanism that can also in practice 
improve the protection of inmates in closed institutions. However, the imprecise 
and indeterminate provisions in the OPCAT (for example: “regularly examine”, 
“treatment” or “required professional capacity”) cannot guide the policies of the 
NPM. For this reason, I underlined the operational aspects of a credible and 
professional NPM. For the Ombudsman to function effectively as an NPM, it 
requires that some of the traditional methodologies of the Ombudsman undergo 
development and re-evaluation.   
This is why the POF as NPM should concentrate on developing its general mode 
of operation or, in other words, the policy aspects of its work. To be effective, the 
Ombudsman should focus less on human rights and more on the policy questions 
of preventing prohibited treatment and developing internal professional capacity 
and a visiting methodology. Developing good policies is difficult, however, as the 
POF is a human rights body (and human rights cannot guide policies), and not an 
expert on the development of closed institutions for the prevention of prohibited 
treatment (which is the main task of the NPM). How does the Ombudsman as NPM 
then know (better than experienced professionals in prisons, migration centres or 
mental hospitals, for example) that his or her recommendations are the right ones?137 
For this reason the NPM, like any other human rights institution, must be 
alert to the development of its practical policies and methodologies. I wrote in 
the OPCAT article that human rights expertise is not enough. Including doctors, 
social workers, and anthropologists on visiting teams would increase the teams’ 
professional capacity and credibility. 
137 See Martti Koskenniemi, “Human Rights Mainstreaming as a Strategy for Institutional Power”, Humanity: 
An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, No 1, 2010, pp.11-12.
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But if outside experts will be used, it is also necessary to reflect the relation 
between this expertise and human rights expertise. In other words: “In the end the 
question emerges, whether there is (or can be) any distinct commitment to human 
rights that would not be a commitment to a particular theory of development, 
security, or administrative appropriateness. If the answer to the question is ‘no’, then 
what reason is there to think that the preferences or biases of the experts would not, 
in time, turn to resemble or to be indistinguishable from the biases and preferences of 
economic experts, security experts, or the typical leanings of administrative routine? 
The paradox appears to be that a human rights preference may stay stable only as 
long as it does not take seriously the other kinds of preferences represented in the 
context of professional interaction.”138 
Comment 
Looking at the OPCAT article from the perspective of this introduction, one can 
see that my article was rather descriptive, uncritical and formal analysis of 
Parliamentary Ombudsman as a potential National Preventive Mechanism under 
the OPCAT. On the other hand, when I drafted the article it was rather difficult for 
me to anticipate in what way the “theory” described in the article would be turned 
into practice.  
As regards possible practical changes in the work of the Ombudsman, I noted 
already at the time of writing the article that to function effectively as a National 
Preventive Mechanism, the Ombudsman has to develop and re-evaluate it its 
visiting methodologies. To be effective NPM the Ombudsman should increase 
the number of inspections it under takes, as well as develop different inspection 
methodologies. Inspections could be divided into thorough and brief inspections, 
follow-up inspections and inspections that concentrate on specific themes, for 
example. The regularity of the inspections can be advanced by increasing inde-
pendent inspections by the legal staff of the Ombudsman’s office. The objectives and 
follow-up methodologies need to be clarified. Unannounced inspection visits should 
also be carried out with greater frequency. Some of those changes have already 
taken place. For example, in 2012, great number of visits was carried out by the 
staff of the Ombudsman (to increase the number of the visits) and a large number 
of visits were so called unannounced visits. 
138 Ibid., p. 12.
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As I see it, the biggest challenge to the Ombudsman’s operational concept 
is probably the fact that the National Preventive Mechanism should endeavor 
to actively prevent inappropriate treatment and not just react to detected legal 
shortcomings or complaints, like a traditional guardian of the law. Another relevant 
question from the practical point of view relates to the possible organizational 
changes. In this connection, reference can be made to the paragraph 32 of the 
Guidelines on national preventive mechanisms adopted by the UN Subcommittee 
on the Prevention on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (SPT) in November 2010, according to which: “Where the body 
designated as the NPM performs other functions in addition to those under the 
Optional Protocol, its NPM functions should be located within separate unit or 
department, with its own staff and budget”.
In addition to this, the Ombudsman should enter into a constructive dialogue 
with the object of inspection to develop the operation of the institution. This requires 
different kind of (policy) skills, expertise and ways to work. In December 2012, the 
OPCAT governmental bill (182/2012) was finally given to the Parliament. For this 
reason, it is still too early to discuss in detail how the theory and practice will meet 
in the office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman. It is stated in the governmental 
bill, for example, that as NPM the Ombudsman can nominate experts to assist him 
or her during inspections. Non-legal expertise in closed institutions is foreseen to 
increase the preventive function of the inspections.    
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11 ConCLuDing observations
At the outset of this synthesis of my seven articles I outlined my view of the problem 
with rights. I stated that human rights are an interplay between theory and practice: 
on the one hand, human rights are conventions, rules and principles; on the other 
hand, these same standards receive their meaning in professional practice. In 
practice these perspectives often merge with each other. I also noted that while 
there is a growing appeal for abstract human rights, there is also disappointment 
and criticism with regard to their practical operation.
On the one hand rights, as conventions and norms, are thought to provide us with 
humanitarian, value-neutral, objective and non-political guidance in a complicated 
and multicultural world. Otherwise human rights would probably not be so popular. 
But human rights are also a practice. Human rights do not speak for themselves; 
they are made to speak in the service of particular people and particular purpose.139 
And when open and conflicting rights are put in the service of the practice, they can 
start to produce both good and bad (liberating or non-liberating) consequences, 
as discussed in section 5. Some critical observers have claimed that human rights 
can also be a bureaucratic state language that does not make much difference at 
all in practice. These two perspectives to rights are reflected in sections 4 and 5 of 
this synthesis. 
My articles, I noted, could also easily be placed somewhere within the tension 
between theory and practice, which is discussed above. Some of my papers discussed 
human rights as rather non-political, unproblematic, and objective standards (the 
theoretical perspective) that could guide societies toward justice, while other articles 
were more concerned with the practical problems, paradoxes and limitations of 
human rights (human rights in practice).  
In this synthesis I have tried to discuss human rights as a tension or interplay 
between theoretical and practical perspectives. Both aspects of rights are always 
present when we discuss or implement human rights. Human rights are a liberating 
theory because it can sometimes provide us with ideals, objectives, standards, 
institutions, and language for injustice and fear. In some contexts, demanding the 
enforcement of abstract human rights  can also in practice challenge existing benefits 
or power structures and provide useful resources (financial, institutional and legal) 
to those who are in marginal positions or outside the clubs of the powerful. Further, 
human rights language can focus our attention on individual suffering and on the 
139 As is noted by Susan Marks in “Human rights in disastrous times”  in  Cambridge Companion to International 
Law (eds. James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi) (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 309-326 at p. 
320.
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demands from individuals to stop prohibited treatment. The global appeal and 
legitimacy of human rights lie in their promise of ending domination and oppression. 
This might also explain why it is that, even though some scholars often find human 
rights indefensible, people continually find them indispensable. To advocates and 
people struggling for democracy, human dignity, and justice, it really doesn’t matter 
whether human rights are universal, inalienable, or Western. What matters is that 
they are – even if only sometimes – useful and available in practice.
But if the international human rights system can serve the powerless, it can also 
serve the powerful.  When abstract human rights ideals are turned into practice, 
human rights become part of the power, administrative routines, expertise and 
bureaucracy, a tool or a weapon for political, moral or legal argument, as discussed 
in this introduction (especially in section 5) and in my articles. 
In the real world human rights can sometimes provide protection and reveal 
inequality and oppression, but they can also conceal and affirm the dominant 
structure and ideology of a society. Human rights can be instruments of emancipation 
and protection but they can also turn out to be a hypocritical practice and an 
institutionalized expert language that sometimes serves and protects existing 
powers and privileges rather than challenges them. For this reason, whether we 
find critical approaches to human rights practice appealing or not, they deserve 
careful consideration.140 
From the point of view of international refugee law, for example, it is not a big 
problem for a human rights government lawyer in professional practice to conclude 
either that those who are escaping war or famine are refugees or that they are not. 
Rights language leaves a lot of room for meaning construction. It is easy on an 
abstract level to agree that no-one should be treated in an inhuman manner, but 
referring to this prohibition cannot avoid the open and manipulable nature of the 
prohibition. In other words, abstract human rights claims and struggles are essential 
as they can bring to the surface exclusion, inclusion and domination, but at the 
same time rights language can authorise whatever does not constitute a violation 
of human rights and frame the struggle of rights as questions of the correct legal 
interpretation of human rights norms. 
For this reason, human rights should not only be viewed as something good or 
bad, but as a tension and dispute between abstract norms and ideals on the one 
hand, and their practical implementation on the other. Both perspectives on human 
rights are needed. If we only view human rights as something good and romantic 
(without thinking practical consequences) we may end up in naïve humanism or 
“human rights theology”. Even from the liberal standpoint, the worst thing that could 
140 On the dual operation of rights, see Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire. The Political Philosophy 
of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), pp. 108-109.
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happen would be that we start taking human rights as a kind of given human rights 
theology, a community of believers, or something taken for granted in moral and 
political debate. Few of us working with human rights want human rights language 
to degenerate into a sort of lingua franca in which moral and political values of all 
or any kinds may be expressed.141 For this reason the modern democratic state or 
human rights bodies whose operation is very much based on the abstract principles 
of “respect for human rights” or “promotion of human rights” should not be blind 
to the long and critical discussion regarding human rights, some of which has been 
considered in this introduction as well as in my articles.  
I have likewise tried to argue that what is needed is a stronger pragmatic weighing 
of human rights in practical context. The pragmatic approach is concerned with the 
operation and results of human rights in practical situations, not with what human 
rights are claimed to be in the abstract. The pragmatist’s approach tries to explain, 
question and critically test human rights practices. What kind of difference do they 
make nationally and globally? Who are the winners and who are the losers? Which 
people and purposes human rights language serve and what kind of arguments are 
used? The costs and benefits of human rights cannot be discussed in the abstract, 
but only in practical contexts. The “correct” interpretations of human rights law do 
not always necessarily promote justice or represent a progressive world view leading 
us towards a more enlightened world. Human rights can also promote “wrong” 
preferences and justify abuses. For this reason human rights “experts”, advocates, 
and institutions need both sensitivity to human rights phenomena and the ability to 
see the concrete and practical consequences of their commitments. Human rights 
should not be viewed as what it is claimed to be but as what it actually is – namely 
a plural and indeterminate discourse that can lead almost anywhere.  
We will not avoid challenges or even clichés regarding human rights by 
avoiding their critical articulation and assessment, “by treating the human rights 
movement as a frail child in need of protection from critical assessment or pragmatic 
calculations”.142 
As Michael Goodhart puts it: 
If we locate the foundation of human rights’ legitimacy in their global 
appeal, as history suggests that we should, these flaws [that modern 
critics identify, JP] need not to shake their foundation. Instead, they 
can become the basis of a self-reflexive critique, one in which the gap 
between the promise of human rights and their practice creates the 
141 Waldron, “Nonsense Upon Stilts”, Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen 1987)  p. 2.  
142 Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?”, European Human Rights 
Law Review, Issue 3, 2001, p. 267.
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normative and conceptual space to reconsider and redefine them again 
and again.143
But on the other hand, if we only underline and emphasise the critical aspects 
of rights, we may lose their liberating promise of ending fear, oppression and 
discrimination. There are also times, professional contexts and strategic as well as 
pragmatic reasons to promote the promise of human rights. In other words, while 
we analyse the many doubts, problems, restrictions, paradoxes and ambiguities that 
surround the practical operation of rights, we also have to acknowledge the many 
possibilities of rights: setting abstract standards and principles, guiding policies, 
providing the vocabulary for discussions in multicultural contexts, the potential 
role of human rights institutions for achieving good results, or the role of human 
rights language as a personal inspiration or commitment towards a better world.  
In the same way, new human rights instruments, like the OPCAT, create 
important new mechanisms for protection against torture and other cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment. Human rights can thus assist in creating credible and 
transparent protection for individuals in closed institutions, for example. However, 
in practice human rights mechanisms and institutions carry with them strengths 
and weaknesses that must be put under scrutiny.144 In practical work human rights 
bodies can have unintended consequences and blind spots that require critical 
analysis instead of more reference to human rights.  
As I see it, the human rights community should be more sensitive to the 
expanding human rights bureaucracy because the politics of human rights might 
turn out to protect particular (political, economic or institutional) interests instead 
of universal interests. Human rights experts may use the same language, operate in 
the same institutions, implement the same rules and share the same experiences, 
thus sometimes reinforcing partial perspectives of a fair balancing of rights. These 
experts are often committed to a particular routine and understanding of what is 
appropriate in a particular administration. Institutionalized human rights jargon can 
lose its capacity to make any difference at all, and can collapse into institutionalized 
and cynical human rights bureaucracy. 
143 Michael Goodhart, “Neither Relative nor Universal: A Response to Donelly”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 
30, 2008, pp. 183-193. 
144 Anne Smith has observed that human rights institutions can play a key role in promoting and protecting 
human rights. However, this unique position also gives rise to problems for such institutions. National 
human rights institutions have to define and defend their role and space in relation to where they fit in 
with government and civil society. One paradox that she explores is how to manage independence while 
simultaneously forging links and creating partnerships with governmental and non-governmental bodies. 
Human rights institutions cannot be the servants of the government but they cannot be independent either. 
How this is all balanced and managed is a central component of the credibility and effectiveness of national 
human rights institutions. See Anne Smith, “The Unique Position of National Human Rights Institutions: A 
Mixed Blessing?”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 28, Number 4, 2006, p. 944. 
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Furthermore, the language of human rights might have difficulty in identifying 
protection-related issues that arise from a complex social reality, say, claims of 
structural injustice, poverty or environmental degradation. Universal freedom of 
religion may turn out to be freedom of religion as understood in the Christian 
context. There is also the danger of hypocrisy, the use of human rights language 
as camouflage for a hidden agenda. Jacques Derrida has likewise identified a list 
of  problems and challenges of globalisation vis-à-vis the practical operation of 
abstract human rights. Derrida talks of the “plagues of the new world order”, giving 
as examples unemployment, the exclusion of immigrants, economic globalisation, 
aggravation of foreign debt, the arms industry, inter-ethnic wars, and phantom 
states. According to Derrida, these challenges show the limits of the human rights 
discourse. In the light of these “plagues of the new world order”, human rights 
will remain “inadequate, sometimes hypocritical, and in any case formalistic and 
inconsistent with itself as long as the law of the market, the foreign debt, the 
inequality of techno-scientific, military, and economic development maintain an 
effective inequality as monstrous as that which prevails today, to a greater extent 
than ever in the history of humanity”.145
One possible dark side posed by human rights is linked to the question of 
professionalism: how do we make sure that human rights experts can provide the 
“right” recommendations to the administration (prison, police, medical, migration 
etc.) or to the religious or minority communities they are advising or monitoring? 
Expert knowledge of “empty” human rights might be a problematic platform for 
promoting justice in areas that mainly operate outside rights. How, in professional 
practice, when open human rights are interpreted can we know whose understanding 
and expertise should be preferred, whose goals supported and whose experience 
or goals are less relevant?  
In the light of my analysis in the articles and this synthesis, the idea of “promoting 
human rights”, or the demand to “respect human rights”, or even “monitoring the 
implementation of human rights” – which are all slogans of rule of law societies – 
can emerge as overly simplistic. It remains unclear what the promotion of human 
rights entails and whose interpretations are included and whose excluded. Instead, 
human rights should be seen as complicated, political and conflictive demands. 
Promoting human rights turns out to be something that is very much dependent 
on the perspective, context, goals and values in the given situation or polity. 
From a non-clichéd and pragmatic perspective of human rights, different kinds 
of understandings and interpretations of human rights constantly challenge and 
145 Jacques Derrida, “Wears and Tears (Tableau of an Ageless World)”, in Patrick Hayden (ed.), The Philosophy 
of Human Rights, Paragon Issues in Philosophy (Paragon House, 2001), p. 265.
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threaten each other. The promise of rights and their practice are a contested space 
that must be considered and defined again and again. 
A reference to human rights should not obscure the political choices and 
decisions, and inclusions and exclusions, that are always involved in the application 
of human rights. It is not always clear whose interpretations (of refugee law, of 
freedom of religion, or of the meaning of rights in multicultural societies) are 
privileged and promoted, and whose interpretations are excluded. The task of 
the pragmatic approach to human rights is precisely to keep visible the circular 
relationship between rights and politics that is always involved in the application 
of human rights. The practice of rights should also affect the theoretical perspective 
on rights: practice should affect and provide information to human rights theory.
We can continue referring to human rights even if we have lost faith in their 
non-political operation. Do we have a better political language to promote justice? 
Maybe their power lies in their enabling of transgressions: no hegemonic imposition, 
no rationality, no law, no judgment, no argument is ever safe from being challenged 
by the many uses of human rights.146 
146 Hoffmann, “Human Rights, the Self and the Other: Reflections on a Pragmatic Theory of Human Rights”, 
in Anne Orford (ed.), International Law and its Others (Cambridge University Press, 2006) p. 244.
